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GUN LAWS AND MENTAL ILLNESS:
RIDDING THE STATUTES OF STIGMA
Susan McMahon*
A man takes aim at people gathered in a public place, killing large
numbers of them. In the hours, days, and weeks to come, police,
politicians, and the media insist that he must have been mentally ill. This
presumed link between mental illness and violence is so unquestioned that
it is enshrined in federal and state laws that prohibit people with mental
illness from possessing guns. But this assumption is deeply wrong.
This Article lays bare the lack of evidence connecting mental
health conditions to violent acts and argues that mental illness gun bans
do nothing more than reinforce the harmful trope that people living with
a mental health condition are intrinsically dangerous. These laws, which
prohibit people with certain indicia of mental health conditions from
purchasing or possessing firearms, fail at their supposed goal of
preventing guns from getting into the hands of dangerous people. They
define the prohibited group in ways that both include many individuals
who will never be violent and exclude many individuals who pose a risk.
Moreover, this focus on mental illness distracts lawmakers from traits
that better predict violence, such as past violent acts and substance
abuse.
The danger stigma has real consequences: It makes employers less
likely to hire individuals with mental illness, landlords less likely to rent
to them, and legislators less likely to allocate money to programs to serve
them. It also makes police more likely to arrest or shoot them.
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Because mental illness gun bans do not accomplish their goals and
instead impose deep psychological and societal harms, they should be
discarded in favor of laws that focus on stronger predictors of violence.
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“I hope to hell that they find when they do the autopsy that
there’s a tumor in his head or something,” Eric Paddock
told reporters, “because if they don’t, we’re all in trouble.”1
INTRODUCTION
When Stephen Paddock took aim out the window of the Mandalay
Bay Resort and Casino in Las Vegas, no medical professional had diagnosed
him with a mental illness. Yet after he murdered fifty-nine attendees of a
country music festival and injured over 800 others, police officers, journalists,
and pundits all insisted that he must have had a mental health condition.
In the hours after the shooting, the Las Vegas mayor called
1

See Elif Batuman, Searching for Motives in Mass Shootings, NEW YORKER (Nov. 27,
2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/searching-for-motives-in-mass-sh
ootings [https://perma.cc/HPZ6-523D] (discussing Paddock’s brother, Stephen Paddock, who
killed fifty-nine people in a shooting in Las Vegas).
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Paddock a “crazed lunatic full of hate”;2 the sheriff in charge described
him as a “psychopath.”3
Days went by with no evidence that Paddock had a mental health
condition, yet police continued to assume that his mind was unwell. “Las Vegas
shooter Stephen Paddock likely had a severe mental illness that was probably
undiagnosed,” read the first sentence in one story. 4
No one could believe that mental health was not at the root of the
murders. When a reporter asked the police department undersheriff if Paddock
had shot these people simply because he could, the undersheriff answered:
“That’s certainly a possibility but it’s one of those possibilities you really can’t
wrap your mind around. I don’t know if I can accept that.”5
The narrative of the dangerous lunatic prevails after nearly every mass
shooting event, as evidenced by the public conversation in the wake of the recent
shootings in El Paso, Texas and Dayton, Ohio. Political leaders immediately
turned to mental health as a cause of such violence, without citing any evidence
that either shooter suffered from a diagnosed mental health condition.6
This search for a reason is all too human. We need motives when people
commit bad acts so that we can understand what led them to do what they did
and distance ourselves from it. 7 When no motive makes itself apparent, the
shooter must have been mentally ill. The alternative—that all humans are
2

John Bacon & Mike James, Las Vegas Shooting: At Least 59 Dead, Gunman Was ‘Crazed
Lunatic Full of Hate,’ USA TODAY (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
nation/2017/10/02/las-vegas-shooting/722191001/ [https://perma.cc/HY28-LLND].
3
Lynh Bui et al., At Least 59 Killed in Las Vegas Shooting Rampage, More Than 500 Others
Injured, WASH. POST (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/
wp/2017/10/02/police-shut-down-part-of-las-vegas-strip-due-to-shooting/ [https://perma.cc/
H44W-83ND].
4
Jeff Farrell, Stephen Paddock: Investigators ‘Believe Las Vegas Shooter Had Severe
Mental Illness That Was Likely Undiagnosed,’ INDEPENDENT (Oct. 9, 2017), https://www.
independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/stephen-paddock-severe-mental-illness-undiagnosed
-fbi-investigators-las-vegas-shooting-a7990021.html [https://perma.cc/S22Y-NS6S].
5
Id.
6
See, e.g., Michael Crowley & Maggie Haberman, Trump Condemns White Supremacy but
Stops Short of Major Gun Controls, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.
com/2019/08/05/us/politics/trump-speech-mass-shootings-dayton-el-paso.html [https://perma.
cc/Q27C-NDZU] (quoting President Trump calling perpetrators of mass shootings “mentally
ill monsters”); Susan Collins (@SenatorCollins), TWITTER (Aug. 4, 2019, 9:21 AM),
https://twitter.com/SenatorCollins/status/1158198526574305280 [https://perma.cc/9S54-QU4E]
(stating, in the wake of the Dayton, El Paso, and Gilroy shootings, “I have long supported
closing loopholes in background checks to prevent the sale of firearms to . . . individuals
with serious mental illness”).
7
See, e.g., William Wan & Mark Berman, ‘I’m Constantly Asking: Why?’ When Mass
Shootings End, the Painful Wait for Answers Begins., WASH. POST (Mar. 15, 2018), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/national/im-constantly-asking-why-when-mass-shootings-endthe-painful-wait-for-answers-begins/2018/03/15/6fb0347e-1d8a-11e8-b2d9-08e748f8
92c0story.html [https://perma.cc/JN72-2DHP].
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capable of violence, and some are capable of it on a horrific scale, and we
never know who is dangerous and who is not—is terrifying.
Insisting that mental illness must be at the root of senseless, violent acts
is both untrue (mental illness accounts for, at most, a tiny sliver of violent
activity8) and stigmatizing.9 Nevertheless, this assumed connection has been
enshrined in laws that ban the purchase or possession of firearms by people
living with a mental illness.10 These mental illness gun bans do little to prevent
violence and serve only to legitimate the false but widespread belief that
individuals with mental illness are more dangerous than others.
Scholars have previously recognized the ineffectiveness of laws
restricting access to firearms by individuals living with mental health
conditions11 and have suggested reforms designed to strengthen current laws.12
This Article goes further. I argue that categorically denying individuals with
mental illness access to guns does not reduce gun violence. Instead, such a ban
legitimates the harmful and inaccurate trope that these individuals are
dangerous. Because mental illness gun bans accomplish little and instead
impose deep psychological and societal harms, they should be repealed.
Moreover, a focus on mental health status distracts from better
predictors of dangerousness—past violent acts or substance abuse. A nopossession law tailored to these traits would more effectively protect the public
without furthering the stigma against those living with mental health conditions.
This Article tackles these issues in five Parts. First, I discuss the
myths and the realities of gun violence and mental illness. Because mass
8

See infra Part I (discrediting the myth that mental illness is a predictor of violent behavior).
See infra Part III (discussing the negative consequences of stigmatizing mental illness).
10
See infra Part II (providing an overview of mental illness gun bans that have been
implemented in many states).
11
See, e.g., Laurie R. Martinelli, Separating Myth from Fact: Unlinking Mental Illness and
Violence and Implications for Gun Control Legislation and Public Policy, 40 NEW ENG. J.
ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 359, 369-70 (2014) (criticizing the “ineffective and
inconsistent” mechanisms embedded in federal gun law).
12
See, e.g., Jana R. McCreary, “Mentally Defective” Language in the Gun Control Act, 45
CONN. L. REV. 813, 854-63 (2013) (arguing for reforms, such as requiring purchasers to
present a certificate of mental health to purchase a gun, that would prevent the “dangerously
mentally ill” from purchasing and possessing firearms); Katherine L. Record & Lawrence
O. Gostin, A Robust Individual Right to Bear Arms Versus the Public’s Health: The Court’s
Reliance on Firearms Restrictions on the Mentally Ill, 6 CHARLESTON L. REV. 371, 383
(2012) (proposing reforms to federal law, including closing the gun show loophole for
background checks and ensuring such checks are rapid and reliable); Fredrick E. Vars,
Symptom-Based Gun Control, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1633, 1636-39 (2014) (discussing the
weaknesses of current policies that restrict gun ownership and arguing for a “symptomsbased approach” that allows a “police officer or mental health professional who observes an
individual suffering from delusions or hallucinations . . . to confiscate that person’s firearms
and to add that person’s name to the federal background check system”).
9
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shootings drive most gun safety legislation, laying bare the relationship—or
lack thereof—between these acts and mental illness is crucial to
understanding the effectiveness of current gun laws. I further note that the
relationship between mental illness and everyday gun violence, which takes
a far greater toll in the United States than mass shootings, is even weaker than
the purported links between mass shootings and mental illness.
Second, I describe the details of the mental illness gun bans and
show how they fail in their objective of preventing dangerous people from
obtaining guns.
Third, I illustrate the harm the dangerousness stigma does to people
living with mental illness. These individuals are arrested at higher rates, have
a difficult time finding housing and employment, and fail to obtain treatment
because their condition has been stigmatized.
Fourth, I address the reasons why mental illness gun bans are so
widespread. These laws seem like good policy on their face, and I grapple
with their justifications and point out the flaws in the reasoning behind them.
Fifth and finally, I point to other indicia of dangerousness that would
both better achieve the goal of stemming gun violence in the United States
and avoid stigmatizing individuals living with mental illness.
I.

GUN VIOLENCE AND MENTAL ILLNESS

In the wake of a mass shooting, gun safety and gun rights advocates
agree on little, but both sides acknowledge that guns should not be in the
hands of “dangerous” people. 13 Almost without fail, the ranks of the
13
For just one example of mental health as a conservative talking point, see, e.g., Ari
Ne’eman, Trump Was Right to Lift a Rule Preventing Some People with Disabilities from
Buying Guns, VOX (Feb. 19, 2018, 1:48 PM), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/
2017/2/6/14522132/gun-control-parkland-disabilities-republicans-nra-obama-liberty [https:
//perma.cc/Q2BK-9KC4] (“After the horrific shootings in Parkland, Florida, last week,
President Donald Trump said very little about gun policy—but quite a bit about mental
health. This has become a common move for many in the GOP, who hope to deflect a
growing wave of pressure for stronger gun control laws.”). Or, as a more inflammatory
example, columnist Ann Coulter in the wake of the Sandy Hook shooting wrote an article
titled, “Guns Don’t Kill People, the Mentally Ill Do.” Ann Coulter, Guns Don’t Kill People,
The Mentally Ill Do, ANN COULTER (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.anncoulter.com/columns
/2013-01-16.html [https://perma.cc/24SS-PV56].
For an example of progressive action on mental health after a mass shooting, see, e.g., OFFICE
OF THE PRESS SEC’Y, THE WHITE HOUSE, FACT SHEET: NEW EXECUTIVE ACTIONS TO
REDUCE GUN VIOLENCE AND MAKE OUR COMMUNITIES SAFER (2016), https://obamawhite
house.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/01/04/fact-sheet-new-executive-actions-reducegun-violence-and-make-our [https://perma.cc/F4Y8-PLEC] (outlining efforts to “increase
mental health treatment and reporting to the background check system”). In the waning days
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“dangerous” include individuals with mental illness.14
This supposed connection between violence and mental illness is not
solely the province of media pundits. Congress and the courts have also
legitimized the connection. When the Supreme Court dismantled the District
of Columbia’s handgun ban as unconstitutional under the Second
Amendment, it noted that “nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast
doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by . . . the
mentally ill.”15 When passing the federal Gun Control Act, which originally
put a federal mental illness gun ban in place, one legislator stated, “No one can
dispute the need to prevent . . . mental incompetents [and] persons with a history
of mental disturbances . . . from buying, owning, or possessing firearms.”16
These restrictions are not nearly as reasonable as the Court and
Congress assumed.17 The supposed connection between mental illness and
violence is cemented by media coverage, exploited by politicians, and
embedded in our gun laws. It is also deeply false.
of President Obama’s second term, the Social Security Administration finalized a rule to
prevent gun purchases by individuals who receive Social Security disability benefits, have a
mental disability, and use a representative payee for their benefit payments. Implementation
of the NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, 81 Fed. Reg. 91,702 (Dec. 19, 2016).
Congress overturned the rule before it was scheduled to take effect. Providing for
Congressional Disapproval Under Chapter 8 of Title 5, United States Code, of the Rule
Submitted by the Social Security Administration Relating to Implementation of the NICS
Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 115-8, 131 Stat. 15 (2017).
14
The tide may be turning on this point in the wake of the El Paso shooting, after President
Trump’s remarks linking mental illness and gun violence. Many media reports after the
shooting questioned the assertion that mental illness caused violent acts, and the American
Psychiatric Association and Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law both produced
statements condemning the connection as unfounded. See, e.g., Nsikan Akpan, Why Mental
Illness Can’t Predict Mass Shootings, PBS NEWSHOUR (Aug. 17, 2019, 8:12 PM),
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/science/why-mental-illness-cant-predict-mass-shootings
[https://perma.cc/VR3U-Y2FH] (arguing that psychological profiles cannot accurately
predict mass shootings); Press Release, Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, APA Condemns Loss of Life
from Gun Violence, Disputes Link to Mass Shootings (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.
psychiatry.org/newsroom/news-releases/apa-condemns-loss-of-life-from-gun-violence-disputes-link-to-mental-illness [https://perma.cc/W2ZD-SKE2] (discrediting rhetoric that links
gun violence to mental illness); Press Release, Judge David L. Bazelon Ctr. for Mental
Health Law, Bazelon Center Statement on Recent El Paso, Texas and Dayton, Ohio
Shootings (Aug. 5, 2019), http://www.bazelon.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/8-5-2019Bazelon-Center-Statement-on-El-Paso-TX-and-Dayton-OH-Shootings.pdf [https://perma.cc/
K92L-SPDT] (condemning “the efforts of some to conflate hatred, bigotry and racism with
mental illness”).
15
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
16
114 CONG. REC. 21,784 (1968) (statement of Rep. Celler).
17
That said, I do not argue that these restrictions are prohibited under the Second Amendment.
Such a conversation is outside the scope of this Article. Instead, my focus is on the normative
value of these laws in light of the harm they cause individuals with mental illness.
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The evidence instead shows that only a handful of the individuals who
have committed mass shootings showed signs of mental illness beforehand.
While in retrospect, we may want to categorize all of these individuals as
“mentally ill”—and we think any reasonable definition of that term must
include a person who would murder multiple strangers for no reason—very
few of these perpetrators met the diagnostic criteria for a serious mental illness
before the shooting. And even those who were diagnosed as mentally ill often
had other signals in their background—past violent acts or substance abuse
problems—that are more closely correlated with violence than mental illness.
Regardless of mental health status, nearly every perpetrator of a
mass shooting harbored resentment and extreme anger, which are better
indicators of the individual’s propensity to commit this type of violence.
In short, mental health status alone does not predict who will turn violent
in an especially public way.
When we broaden our lens to look past mass shootings, we find that
the link between gun violence and individuals with mental illness weakens
even further. Individuals living with a mental health condition are no more
likely to be violent than their neighbors.
A. The Myth
Stephen Paddock had never been diagnosed with a mental illness
when he shot and killed fifty-nine people at a music festival in Las Vegas.18
Yet, when asked about motive, the sheriff leading the investigation said, “I
can’t get into the mind of a psychopath.”19 Speaker of the House Paul Ryan
pivoted immediately to a mental health cause: “[M]ental health reform is a
critical ingredient to making sure we can try and prevent some of these
things from happening.”20
In the week after the shooting, investigators speculated that Paddock
had a “severe mental illness” that was likely undiagnosed: “The portrait,
gleaned from interviews with hundreds of people interviewed over the past
week, is that while Paddock might have been financially successful, he had
real difficulty interacting with people. He is described as standoffish,
disconnected, a man who had difficulty establishing and maintaining

18
See Batuman, supra note 1 (noting that “Paddock apparently exhibited . . . no symptoms
of mental illness”).
19
Bui et al., supra note 3.
20
Rebecca Shabad, Paul Ryan Says Mental Health Reform Is “Critical Ingredient” in
Stopping Mass Shootings, CBS NEWS (Oct. 3, 2017, 12:44 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com
/news/paul-ryan-says-mental-health-reform-is-critical-ingredient-in-stopping-mass-shootings [https://perma.cc/3QVL-YSQD].
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meaningful relationships.”21 The article makes no mention of what “severe
mental illness” has these symptoms.
Even months later, after a scan of Paddock’s brain showed no
abnormalities and no history of mental illness had emerged,22 a news story
analyzing the investigation report of the shooting focused on Paddock’s
mental health, noting that his primary care doctor—not a psychiatrist—
believed he had bipolar disorder and had prescribed him diazepam, a common
anti-anxiety medication.23 The article even cites drugabuse.com in noting
that diazepam can cause aggressive behaviors but provides no evidence
either that the drug can provoke premeditated murders or that Paddock ever
took the medication.24
21
Pierre Thomas, Investigators Believe Las Vegas Gunman Had Severe Undiagnosed Mental
Illness: Sources, ABC NEWS (Oct. 7, 2017, 6:32 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/
investigators-las-vegas-gunman-severe-undiagnosed-mental-illness/story?id=50346433 [https
://perma.cc/7XHJ-3DQU].
22
See, e.g., Sheri Fink, Las Vegas Gunman’s Brain Exam Only Deepens Mystery of His
Actions, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/09/us/las-vegasattack-paddock-brain-autopsy.html [https://perma.cc/V7K6-NM6F] (“Stephen Paddock . . .
had not had a stroke, brain tumor or a number of other neurological disorders that might have
helped explain his actions . . . .”). Though Paddock’s brain scan showed some signs of
abnormalities, experts remain unsure about their cause. Id.
23
Colton Lochhead, Las Vegas Shooting Report Explores Gunman’s Mental Health, LAS
VEGAS REV.-J. (Jan. 19, 2018, 8:13 PM), https://www.reviewjournal.com/crime/shootings
/las-vegas-shooting-report-explores-gunmans-mental-health [https://perma.cc/5B3WDQJ2].
24
Id. Diazepam, the generic name for Valium, is one of the most prescribed drugs in the
United States. See, e.g., ANDREA TONE, THE AGE OF ANXIETY: A HISTORY OF AMERICA’S
TURBULENT AFFAIR WITH TRANQUILIZERS 153 (2008) (“Valium rapidly became a staple in
medicine cabinets, as common as toothbrushes and razors.”); Arnie Cooper, An Anxious
History of Valium, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 15, 2013, 7:30 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ananxious-history-of-valium-1384547451 [https://perma.cc/J7D3-5YAS] (“Approved by the
Food and Drug Administration in 1963, F. Hoffmann-La Roche’s drug, marketed to ‘reduce
psychic tension,’ went on to become the Western world’s most widely prescribed answer to
anxiety—and the first drug to reach $1 billion in sales.”). The side effect of “aggressive
behaviors” is rare and studies have reached conflicting results on whether it even exists.
Furthermore, the aggression observed during these studies was sudden fits of rage, not
violent acts of meticulous planning. See Robert Kellner, Unwanted Effects of Minor
Tranquilizers and Hypnotics, 5 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS, Nov. 1975, at 43, 44 (“The findings
can be summed up as follows: In normal volunteers, chlordiazepoxide increases hostility;
unexpected outbursts of rage have been reported in patients taking chlordiazepoxide and
diazepam, but these are rare.”); Jari Tiihonen et al., Psychotropic Drugs And Homicide: A
Prospective Cohort Study From Finland, 14 WORLD PSYCHIATRY 245, 246 (2015) (finding
that “benzodiazepine and analgesic use was linked with a higher risk of homicidal offending,
and the findings remained highly significant even after correction for multiple comparisons,”
but noting that the study’s results likely could not be generalized “to countries with higher
rates of organized and premeditated crime”). Chlordiazepoxide is an anti-anxiety medication
similar to diazepam; both drugs are classified as benzodiazepines. See, e.g., Johns Hopkins
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This kind of speculation about mental illness, even in the absence of
any evidence, is rife after a mass shooting.25 The mere fact of the carnage
supports a conclusion that the shooter was mentally ill. 26 Only
“psychopaths”27 and the “deranged”28 would commit such a terrible act,
we tell ourselves.29
Psychiatry Guide: Benzodiazepines, JOHNS HOPKINS MED. (Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.
hopkinsguides.com/hopkins/view/Johns_Hopkins_Psychiatry_Guide/787140/all/Benzodiaz
epines [https://perma.cc/EE7F-4VEH]. Even if diazepam were somehow linked to mass
shootings, there is no evidence Paddock took the medication, only that he was prescribed it.
25
See, e.g., Matthew E. Hirschtritt & Renee L. Binder, A Reassessment of Blaming Mass
Shootings on Mental Illness, 75 JAMA PSYCHIATRY 311, 311 (2018) (describing the
tendency of “policy makers, journalists, and the public” to link mental illness to mass
shootings); Miranda Lynne Baumann & Brent Teasdale, Severe Mental Illness and Firearm
Access: Is Violence Really the Danger?, 56 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 44, 48 (2018) (“In the
wake of major gun violence events in the United States, popular discourse inevitably
implicates firearm access among individuals with severe mental illness as a major
contributing factor to the nation's gun violence epidemic. We found no support for this
claim.” (citations omitted)).
26
See David Tarrant, Despite Popular Belief, It’s Hard to Find a Direct Link Between Mental
Illness and Mass Shootings Like Orlando’s, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Jun. 15, 2016, 1:40
PM), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/2016/06/15/despite-popular-belief-its-hard-to-find
-a-direct-link-between-mental-illness-and-mass-shootings-like-orlandos/ [https://perma.cc/
VJX2-N8NK] (“‘When you see shootings like those at Newtown, Conn., or Aurora, Colo.,
it’s hard to argue that mental illness didn’t play a role,’ [said Jonathan Metzl, a professor of
sociology and psychiatry at Vanderbilt University]. But the shooter’s mental state is only
one of several factors involved, he said.”).
27
“Psychopath” is not a diagnosis in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, see generally
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
(5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-5], but it is common shorthand for one who is mentally ill,
see PHILIP T. YANOS, WRITTEN OFF: MENTAL HEALTH STIGMA AND THE LOSS OF HUMAN
POTENTIAL 60-61 (2018) (noting that the New York Post used the terms “psycho,” “schizo,”
and “madman” as synonymous with violence).
28
See, e.g., Samantha Raphelson, What We Know About the Alleged Texas High School
Shooter, NPR (May 19, 2018, 6:22 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018
/05/19/612468377/what-we-know-about-dimitrios-pagourtzis-the-alleged-texas-high-school
-shooter [https://perma.cc/LCG5-JZP3] (quoting one student who said Santa Fe High School
shooter Dimitrios Pagourtzis “looks like a psychopath”); Andrew Restuccia, Trump: Texas
Shooting Result of ‘Deranged Individual,’ ‘Isn’t a Guns Situation,’ POLITICO (Nov. 6, 2017,
2:16 PM), https://www.politico.eu/article/trump-texas-shooting-result-of-deranged-individual
-isnt-a-guns-situation/?lo=ap_b1 [https://perma.cc/UZ53-HXME] (quoting Trump describing Sutherland Springs shooter Devin Kelley as “deranged”); Jacob Rodriguez & Heather
Crawford, Community Still Mourns 1 Year After Pulse Nightclub Massacre, CBS19 (June
12, 2017, 4:18 PM), https://www.cbs19.tv/article/news/nation-now/orlando-shooting/ community-still-mourns-1-year-after-pulse-nightclub-massacre/77-447434546 [https://perma.cc/ 5W3CWTHJ] (describing Pulse Nightclub shooter Omar Mateen as a “psychopath with a rifle”).
29
See, e.g., NAT’L COUNCIL FOR BEHAVIORAL HEALTH, MASS VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: CAUSES,
IMPACTS AND SOLUTIONS 5 (2019), https://www.thenationalcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/
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This simplistic explanation both is unsupported by the data, as I
demonstrate in more detail in the following Section, and elides the
complexities of mental illness. Mental illness, as conceived of and
categorized in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, is as multifaceted a term
as physical illness. It is comprised of a host of individual diagnoses, ranging
from schizophrenia to eating disorders. 30 There is no diagnosis for “mass
shooter,” and even a violent act is not generally a symptom of a particular
mental illness unless it is part of a pattern of such acts and accompanied by
feelings of remorselessness and lack of empathy for others.31
Blaming “mental illness” for mass shootings thus is nonsensical. It
would be like blaming “physical illness” for death. Such a statement tells us
nothing about the specific behaviors that could be predictors of violent
behavior or the causal pathways that supposedly connect mental illness with
violent acts. It serves only to make the perpetrator an “other,” to separate him
from the rest of society, using the language of mental health.32
This narrative has corrosive effects on the millions of individuals
living with mental illness. Connecting mental illness and mass shootings
hardens public attitudes against individuals with mental illness and further
ingrains stigma in the public discourse and in the legal landscape. One study
found that in the weeks following a shooting perpetrated by an individual
with serious mental illness, news stories usually mentioned dangerous people
as the cause of violence instead of dangerous weapons.33 This type of news
coverage “may lead the public to view [serious mental illness] as an important
cause of gun violence, when in reality other factors—such as criminals’ easy
access to firearms—are more strongly associated with violent crime.”34
The policy conversations held in the wake of these events also reinforce
the connection between dangerous people and mass shootings. Proposed
legislation to prevent mass shootings inevitably involves restrictions on the
ability of people with mental health conditions to obtain firearms, regardless of
whether the shooter actually suffered from a diagnosed serious mental illness.
2019/08/Mass-Violence-in-America_8-6-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ZFU-S34W] (“Since it is
difficult to imagine that a mentally healthy person would deliberately kill multiple strangers, it is
commonly assumed that all perpetrators of mass violence must be mentally ill.”).
30
DSM-5, supra note 27.
31
Id. at 659-63 (defining antisocial personality disorder).
32
See MICHAEL PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL 36 (2000)
(noting that associating mental illness and violence “allow[s] us to use the label of ‘sickness’
as reassurance that the other . . . is not like us”).
33
See Emma E. McGinty et al., News Media Framing of Serious Mental Illness and Gun
Violence in the United States, 1997–2012, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 406, 411 (2014) (finding
“[a] higher proportion of news stories mentioned dangerous people with [serious mental
illness] as opposed to dangerous weapons as the cause of gun violence”).
34
Id.
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For example, almost immediately after a shooter killed seventeen
people at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida, gun
safety advocates and legislators called for restrictions on the sale of firearms
to people with mental health conditions as a way to prevent such shootings
in the future.35 The law eventually incorporated a prohibition on the purchase
or possession of firearms by one who has been “adjudicated mentally
defective” or committed to a mental health facility.36 The shooter himself,
who had never stayed in a mental health facility or appeared before a judge
as a result of a mental health condition, would not have been prevented from
buying a firearm under such restrictions.37
As the news media and legislatures draw these links between mental
illness and violence, the fear of individuals with mental illness grows
stronger. For example, in one study, individuals who read a news story about
a mass shooting committed by an individual with serious mental illness were
more likely to believe that all people with serious mental health conditions
were dangerous.38 Thus, every time a news report implicitly blames mental
illness as the cause of a violent act, every time a legislature passes a law on
mental health issues in a bill designed to address gun violence, the public sees
its fear of individuals with mental illness as justified, and the association grows.

35

See Susan Ferrechio, Paul Ryan: Congress Should Focus on Mental Health and Background
Checks, Not Gun Ban, WASH. EXAMINER (Feb. 27, 2018), http://www.washingtonexaminer.
com/paul-ryan-congress-should-focus-on-mental-health-and-background-checks-not-gun-ban/
article/2650142 [https://perma.cc/6CA2-YXVC] (quoting Paul Ryan calling for Congress to
emphasize mental health and fix the background check system); Eric Levenson, These Are the
Gun Bills Florida Lawmakers Are Debating After the Parkland Massacre, CNN (Feb. 28,
2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/27/politics/fl-bills-guns-parkland-shooting/index.html [https:
//perma.cc/V934-RQVR] (referencing efforts by Florida lawmakers to pass a mental health bill in
the wake of the Parkland shooting).
36
Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act, S. 7026, § 10, 2016 Sen., Reg.
Sess. (Fl. 2018).
37
See Phil McCausland, Florida Mental Health Agency Examined Cruz in 2016, Didn’t
Hospitalize Him, NBC NEWS (Feb. 19, 2018, 7:51 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/usnews/social-media-post-led-florida-agency-investigate-nikolas-cruz-2016-n849221 [https://
perma.cc/C9A3-ZLR9] (noting that Cruz had not been hospitalized, implicitly leaving him
outside the scope of the relevant prohibition).
38
See Emma E. McGinty et al., Effects of News Media Messages About Mass Shootings on
Attitudes Toward Persons with Serious Mental Illness and Public Support for Gun Policies,
170 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 494, 498-99 (2013) (concluding that depictions of violent people
with mental illness in the news contributed to the public’s negative attitudes about all people
living with serious mental health conditions); see also Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Mental
Illness and Reduction of Gun Violence and Suicide: Bringing Epidemiologic Research to
Policy, 25 ANNALS EPIDEMIOLOGY 366, 367 (2015) (“The public perception of a strong link
between mental illness and violence is fueled in part by news coverage of mass shootings
and other violent events.”).
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B. The Facts
Yet the myth that those who suffer from mental illnesses are dangerous
is not supported by the data. When we look to mass shootings, some weak links
do appear connecting individuals suffering from symptoms of mental illness
and these tragic events. But there is not a direct line between mental illness and
mass shootings; the correlation has varied significantly across studies, even
disappearing altogether in some analyses. Moreover, even when the correlation
exists, mental illness may not be the main driver of mass shooting events. Other
correlates—especially feelings of resentment and entitlement—are more
closely associated with random public violence.
When we broaden our scope to look not just at the rare mass shooting
event but at the much larger problem of gun violence overall, the links between
mental illness and violence disappear almost entirely. Better predictors of gun
violence are past violent acts or substance abuse.
1. Mass Shootings39
The link between mass shootings and mental illness is far more modest
than the conversations in the wake of a mass shooting would suggest, appearing
in some studies, disappearing in others, and never conclusively pinpointing
mental illness as a cause. One review of the literature noted, “Psychiatric illness,
although present in some mass murderers and mass shooters, is far from the
most significant or consistent finding from attempts to investigate the nature of
these deeply troubling events.”40
In the following pages, I tease out the themes from these studies,
beginning with those that show no links between mental illness and mass
shootings before moving on to those where some connections appeared.

39

Definitions of the term “mass shooting” vary widely, but since my focus is on the events
that garner media coverage and drive the conversation on gun policy, I will adopt the
definition used by Mother Jones in its mass-shootings compilation, which is designed to
focus on public mass murders, rather than all murders with a high body count: “four or more
victims killed in an indiscriminate public rampage.” Mark Follman et al., A Guide to Mass
Shootings in America, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 31, 2019), https://www.motherjones.com/
politics/2012/07/mass-shootings-map/ [https://perma.cc/R7JZ-JEK5]; see also Mark Follman,
No, There Has Not Been a Mass Shooting Every Day This Year, MOTHER JONES (Dec. 18,
2015), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/12/no-there-were-not-355-mass-shootings
-this-year/ [https://perma.cc/46XR-DXGS].
40
James L. Knoll & George D. Annas, Mass Shootings and Mental Illness, in GUN VIOLENCE
AND MENTAL ILLNESS 83 (2016).
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We begin with a recent FBI study of active shooter41 incidents.42 Of
the sixty-three active shooters sampled, only three had been diagnosed with
a psychotic disorder at the time of the study.43 A greater spectrum of these
shooters, twenty-five percent, had been diagnosed with a mental illness of
some kind. 44 Aside from the three shooters who were diagnosed with a
psychotic disorder, twelve active shooters had been diagnosed with a mood
disorder, such as depression, four had been diagnosed with an anxiety
disorder, and two had been diagnosed with personality disorders.45
These mental illnesses have little in common symptomatically. A
psychotic disorder involves a problem with cognition or thinking; the
individual hears things that are not there or believes things that are not true.46
Individuals suffering from mood or anxiety disorders have elevated
emotional states; their emotions interfere with their daily lives. 47 And an
individual with a personality disorder has an “enduring pattern of inner
experience and behavior that deviates markedly from the expectations of the
individual’s culture,” which cannot be explained through a diagnosis of
another type of mental illness.48
Because these mental disorders manifest so differently, it is difficult
to conclude that “mental illness” is the driver of active shootings. The
41

These researchers defined an “active shooter” as one engaged in killing or attempting to
kill people in a populated area and identified 160 such incidents from between 2000 and
2013. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, A STUDY OF ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS IN THE
UNITED STATES BETWEEN 2000 AND 2013, at 5 (2013). While there is some overlap between
these events and the Mother Jones “mass shooter” definition, the two are not entirely
coextensive because the FBI counts events with fewer victims as “active shooter” incidents.
Id. From their original list, the FBI culled the sixty-three shooters: (1) for whom there was
an adequate law enforcement record to determine motivations and pre-attack behaviors, and
(2) who planned their attacks in advance. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, A STUDY OF THE
PRE-ATTACK BEHAVIORS OF ACTIVE SHOOTERS 8 (2018).
42
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, A STUDY OF THE PRE-ATTACK BEHAVIORS OF ACTIVE
SHOOTERS, supra note 41, at 26.
43
Id. at 17.
44
Id.
45
Id. While these numbers add up to more than twenty-five percent, some of the perpetrators
had co-occurring mental health conditions, meaning that one person had been diagnosed with
more than one mental illness. Id.
46
The hallmark of psychotic disorders like schizophrenia is a symptom of malfunctioning thinking,
such as delusions, hallucinations, or disorganized speech. DSM-5, supra note 27, at 87-88.
47
To be diagnosed with major depression, for example, individuals must experience at least
five symptoms every day for a two-week period or more; symptoms include frequent
thoughts of death, significant unintentional weight gain or loss, fatigue, insomnia, inability
to concentrate, diminished pleasure in most activities, and feelings of worthlessness or guilt.
DSM-5, supra note 27, at 160-61.
48
DSM-5, supra note 27, at 645. An individual diagnosed with antisocial personality
disorder, for example, exhibits a pervasive pattern of “disregard for, and violation of, the
rights of others.” DSM-5, supra note 27, at 659.

14

Journal of Law & Public Affairs

[Jan. 2020

psychotic symptoms experienced by the person living with schizophrenia are
not necessarily shared by those with mood or personality disorders.49 If one
with schizophrenia shoots because he is hallucinating, then that cause fails to
explain why a person with depression shoots or why an individual with
antisocial personality disorder shoots.50
Moreover, while the fact that twenty-five percent of shooters suffered
from a diagnosed mental illness may seem to indicate a high correlation
between such afflictions and active shooters, about the same number of active
shooters (twenty-four percent) had a military background.51 A much higher
percentage were male (ninety-four percent) and white (sixty-three percent).52
The FBI has therefore concluded that a diagnosis of mental illness did
not have much predictive value in attempting to determine who will become
an active shooter. 53 As the researchers wrote in their report, “[F]ormally
diagnosed mental illness is not a very specific predictor of violence of any
type, let alone targeted violence.”54
One study of a different set of individuals, thirty-four adolescents who
committed mass murders between 1958 and 1999, produced results that mirrored
the patterns found by the FBI.55 Researchers found that a similar proportion,
twenty-three percent of the murderers, had a psychiatric treatment history,56 and

49

That said, individuals can experience symptoms of multiple mental illnesses at once. For
example, about twenty-five percent of individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia also meet
the criteria for depression. See Samuel G. Siris, Depression in Schizophrenia: Perspective in
the Era of “Atypical” Antipsychotic Agents, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1379, 1380 (2000). But
simply because this is true does not negate the problem of causal pathways. We still do not
know whether it was the psychotic symptoms of schizophrenia, or the emotional symptoms
of depression, or neither, or both in tandem, that caused the given violent act.
50
See Knoll & Annas, supra note 40, at 90 (“The likelihood of error and oversimplification
is substantial when mental illness is considered on ‘the aggregate level’ such that a ‘vast and
diverse population of persons diagnosed with psychiatric conditions’ is considered to
uniformly represent people who are at risk of committing gun violence against others.”
(citing Jonathan M. Metzl & Kenneth T. Macleish, Mental Illness, Mass Shootings, and the
Policies of American Fire-Arms, 105 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 240 (2015))); cf. Vars, supra note
12, at 1639-42 (arguing that specific symptoms, especially psychotic symptoms, were more
closely aligned with violence than a diagnosis of mental illness; “it appears that not every
diagnosis carries an increased risk of violence”).
51
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, A STUDY OF THE PRE-ATTACK BEHAVIORS OF ACTIVE
SHOOTERS, supra note 41, at 11.
52
Id. at 10.
53
Id. at 17.
54
Id.
55
John Reid Meloy et al., A Comparative Analysis of North American Adolescent and Adult
Mass Murderers, 22 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 291 (2004).
56
Id. at 297.
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only two of the perpetrators were psychotic at the time of the murders.57
But some analyses have looked beyond diagnosed mental illness to
symptoms of mental illness—diagnosed or not—and here the picture
becomes somewhat more complicated. For example, a Mother Jones
examination of mass shootings furthers the narrative of mass shootings as an
outgrowth of a mental health condition.58 Of 110 mass shootings counted as
of the writing of this Article, the perpetrators of fifty-nine, just over half, had
“prior signs of mental health issues.”59
But a look at what, specifically, these signs of a mental health
condition were raises more questions than it answers. Some of the entries
classified individuals as showing signs of a mental health condition based on
vague statements from third parties. For example, a cousin said Douglas
Williams, who killed six people at his Lockheed Martin workplace before
committing suicide, “was depressed and ‘going through a lot of things.’”60
Neighbors said Terry Michael Ratzmann, who killed six people at his church,
“suffered from depression and had a drinking problem.”61
In other entries in the database, past violent acts qualified as a sign of
a mental health condition. Devin Kelley, who shot twenty-six people at a
church in Sutherland Springs, Texas, “had a history of domestic violence.”62
Jimmy Lam, who shot three of his coworkers, had “a history of domestic,
work conflicts.”63 These past violent acts are not necessarily a sign of a
mental health condition; classifying them as such is a sign that the authors
were not particularly careful in who they placed in the mental health
condition box.
A different study honed in on psychotic symptoms and did find some
links between that type of mental illness and mass violence.64 Researchers
assessed thirty adult mass murderers 65 and found that sixty-seven percent
were either diagnosed with a psychotic disorder or exhibited behaviors
57

Id.; see also Lisa Aitken et al., Mass Murders: Implications for Mental Health
Professionals, 38 INT’L J. PSYCHIATRY MED. 261, 264 (2008) (noting that only six percent
of adolescent mass murderers showed signs of psychosis).
58
Follman et al., A Guide to Mass Shootings in America, supra note 39.
59
Id. (click on “open-source database documenting mass shootings” to view data).
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Meloy et al., supra note 55, at 303-04.
65
Researchers limited their sample to single adults who intentionally killed three victims
other than themselves in a single incident, using a firearm as a weapon. Id. They excluded
multiple murders that fit into another category of homicide, i.e., serial, spree, felony related,
gang motivated, or politically motivated. Id. at 295; see also Anthony Hempel et al., Offender
and Offense Characteristics of a Nonrandom Sample of Mass Murderers, 27 J. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 213, 214 (1999) (employing the same definition).
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associated with psychosis.66
To be sure, there is a subset of the ranks of mass shooters who do
exhibit psychotic symptoms. Jared Loughner, who murdered six people in a
parking lot during a meet-and-greet with Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords,
had displayed psychotic symptoms before the shooting. 67 He talked to
himself, laughed inappropriately, and was paranoid about the government
following him.68 James Holmes visited a campus psychiatrist before shooting
twelve people in a movie theater in Aurora, Colorado.69 At their last meeting,
he made homicidal and paranoid statements; the psychiatrist was concerned
that he was sliding into schizophrenia.70
The wild swings in percentages of individuals who have diagnosable
mental disorders, especially those with psychotic symptoms, may be a
function of the small sample sizes when dealing with mass shootings. These
are such rare events that small changes in the composition of the sample can
lead to massive fluctuations in results.71
But even accepting the most damning view of these statistics, that
two-thirds of mass shooters harbor psychotic symptoms, 72 the question
remains whether it is the psychosis that drives the actions or some other
factor. All of these studies are retrospective, nonrandom, and small. They
draw only from the pool of mass shooters and do not have a comparison
group. 73 As one researcher cautioned, these shortcomings mean that the
66

Meloy et al., supra note 55, at 305.
See Sarah Gassen & Timothy Williams, Before Attack, Parents of Gunman Tried to
Address Son’s Strange Behavior, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2013), https://www.nytimes
.com/2013/03/28/us/documents-2011-tucson-shooting-case-gabrielle-giffords.html [https://
perma.cc/WF3W-WNQE].
68
See Cindy Carcamo & Michelle Mello, Reports Detail Jared Loughner’s Behavior Before
Tucson Shooting, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2013), https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-xpm2013-mar-27-la-na-ff-jared-loughner-20130328-story.html [https://perma.cc/PAH5-8DGP]
(“In an interview with law enforcement officials, Loughner’s mother, Amy Loughner, said
her son had been acting strangely for about a year, often talking or laughing to himself, and
was angry with the government, though she did not say why.”); Benedict Cary, Red Flags at
a College, but Tied Hands, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/
2011/01/11/us/11mental.html [https://perma.cc/NCL5-CT8J] (“Sometimes surly, sometimes
seemingly unhinged, [Loughner] was unpredictable in a way that made fellow students in a
community college class want to leave the room.”).
69
Matthew Nussbaum et al., Aurora Theater Shooting Gunman Told Doctor: “You Can’t Kill
Everyone,” DENV. POST (Jun. 16, 2015), https://www.denverpost.com/2015/06/16/auroratheater-shooting-gunman-told-doctor-you-cant-kill-everyone/ [https://perma.cc/Z58Z-9CES].
70
Id.
71
See Paul Appelbaum, Public Safety, Mental Disorders, and Guns, 70 JAMA PSYCHIATRY
565, 565 (2013).
72
Meloy et al., supra note 55, at 303-05.
73
The problem with this approach is that the researchers select the study group based solely
67
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studies have no predictive value; their findings cannot be generalized to
disrupt future mass shootings.74
Thus, while psychosis may be correlated with mass shootings (and
even the correlation has not been definitively proven),75 it may not be the
cause of mass shootings.76 Jared Loughner, for example, was known to use
drugs around the time of the Tucson shooting;77 drug and alcohol abuse are
more highly correlated with violence than mental illness and could be the
driver behind the act.78
Researchers have also found that one common thread linking most
mass murderers was extreme anger paired with a feeling that others were
treating the shooter unfairly.79 Shooters felt as if they were entitled to kill
others because of the wrongs that had been done to them.80 These threads
were present regardless of whether the individual had symptoms of
psychosis or other mental illness.81 As one expert on mass shootings noted
on the dependent variable and do not compare that group to any other group, which means
no causal links can be drawn. They do not look to the entirety of the U.S. population to see
who turns out to be a mass shooter; they look only to mass shooters to see what characteristics
they possess. As a perhaps helpful analogy that illustrates the problems with this approach,
a study group comprised only of dead people would show that going to the hospital is a
mortality risk. See, e.g., DONALD T. CAMPBELL & JULIAN C. STANLEY, EXPERIMENTAL AND
QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR RESEARCH 6-7 (1963) (describing this type of study as
having “such a total absence of control as to be of almost no scientific value”).
74
Hempel et al., supra note 65, at 224.
75
See, e.g., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 41, at 7, 17 (finding that only three
out of sixty-three active shooters (or just under five percent) had been diagnosed with a
psychotic disorder).
76
Cf. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 173 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (“Correlation is not causation.”).
77
A.G. Sulzberger & Jennifer Medina, Shooting Suspect Had Been Known to Use Potent,
and Legal, Hallucinogen, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2011, at A16.
78
See infra Section I.B.2.
79
See Knoll & Annas, supra note 40, at 84 (“Factors common among individuals who
commit mass murder include extreme feelings of anger and revenge, the lack of an
accomplice (when the perpetrator is an adult), feelings of social alienation, and planning well
in advance of the offense.”).
80
As stated in A Comparative Analysis of North American Adolescent and Adult Mass
Murderers,
Ubiquitous throughout our data for both the adolescents and the adults is
a pathologically narcissistic belief that they had a right to kill others, a
sense of entitlement that may have been exacerbated by the porcupine
quills of paranoia or the suffocating blanket of depression. Such feelings
and attitudes, however, still need to be hardened by a shell of callousness
to be acted upon.
Meloy et al., supra note 55, at 304.
81
Id.; see also James Fox & Monica DeLateur, Mass Shootings in America: Moving Beyond
Newtown, 18 HOMICIDE STUD. 125, 133 (2013) (finding that mass shooters tend to share
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after the Parkland murders, “Most of these shooters are angry, antisocial
individuals you cannot spot in advance.”82
The truth is, these events are so rare that we simply do not know, and
likely will never know, their root cause. 83 Yet mass shooters are often
characterized as mentally ill, regardless of their actual mental health status.
This finger-pointing occurs despite the fact that certain traits, such as extreme
anger hardened by resentment and entitlement, are stronger predictors of who
will turn publicly, randomly violent than a mental illness diagnosis alone.
2. Other Types of Gun Violence
While mass shootings and other sensational events tend to drive gun
policy,84 they remain extraordinarily rare events.85 Gun murders due to angry
altercations, domestic violence, and other criminal activity, like robberies or
drugs, are far more common.86 On average, almost thirty-three people are
murdered with a gun every day in the United States.87 Let’s look at May 19,
2019, the day before I wrote this paragraph, as an example. Early that
morning, police found Dorian Brooks dead from a gunshot wound on a city
street in Savannah, Georgia. 88 At around 6 A.M., in Muskegon Heights,
Michigan, a husband returned to his home and shot his wife four times, killing

some behavioral characteristics, such as resentment, social isolation, and the tendency to
externalize blame).
82
Benedict Carey, Opening Mental Hospitals Unlikely to Prevent Mass Shootings, Experts
Say, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/22/health/trumpmental-hospitals-parkland.html [https://perma.cc/NCL5-CT8J].
83
See Jeffrey W. Swanson, Explaining Rare Acts of Violence: The Limits of Evidence from
Population Research, 62 PSYCHIATRIC SERV. 1369, 1369 (2011) (explaining that “we do not
possess the data” to conduct epidemiological studies into the causes of mass shootings).
84
See, e.g., Swanson et al., supra note 38, at 366 (describing the Newtown shooting as
opening “a rare public window of opportunity to enact meaningful reforms to reduce gun
violence in America”).
85
Swanson, supra note 83, at 1369.
86
See, e.g., DEBRA L. KARCH ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
SURVEILLANCE FOR VIOLENT DEATHS, NATIONAL VIOLENT DEATH REPORTING SYSTEM, 16
STATES, 2007, at 10 (finding that, for cases where causes were known, about thirty-three
percent of homicides were precipitated by another crime like robbery, assault, or drug-related
incidents).
87
Eugenio Weigend Vargas, Gun Violence in America: A State-by-State Analysis, CTR. FOR
AM. PROGRESS (2019), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/guns-crime/news/2019/11
/20/477218/gun-violence-america-state-state-analysis/ [https://perma.cc/64GL-26AA].
88
Police Investigate After Gunshot Victim Found in Downtown Savannah, WTOC (May 19,
2019), https://www.wtoc.com/2019/05/19/savannah-police-investigate-after-gunshot-victim
-found-downtown-savannah/ [https://perma.cc/TP4D-AHFT].
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her, after they had argued and he had moved out.89 Later that day, at a college
graduation party in Arlington, Texas, a man shot and killed a sixty-threeyear-old fellow partygoer after they got into a fight.90 These acts are not the
rare-but-sensational mass murder but the run-of-the-mill killings so common
that they are no more than blips on the local news.
When we examine this kind of gun violence, the uncertain links with
mental illness dissipate further. Studies in the last three decades have shown
that the assumed link between mental illness and violent acts is attenuated at
best, and that other factors, such as substance abuse, are more highly
correlated with violence.91
The MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study, which analyzed
links between violence and mental illness, followed 1,136 individuals for one
year after their discharge from a psychiatric hospital and compared them to
519 people who lived in the same neighborhoods.92 Researchers found that
individuals with mental illness and no substance abuse disorder were no more
likely to be violent than their neighbors.93
This data set is the only study that compared a population with mental
illness to their neighbors, thus controlling for environmental effects that may
increase violence. 94 Because these individuals resided in the same places,
usually neighborhoods with high levels of poverty, the rates of violence were
somewhat elevated above national norms.95
89

Suspect in Custody Following Fatal Muskegon Heights Shooting, WZZM13 (May 19, 2019),
https://www.wzzm13.com/article/news/suspect-in-custody-following-fatal-muskegon-heightsshooting/69-c13ce65e-5e32-4be9-a6b1-7a96f7e16ebb [https://perma.cc/8D2U-Z7W9].
90
Jake Harris, 1 Dead After Shooting at College Grad Party in Arlington, Police Say,
WFAA8 (May 19, 2019), https://www.wfaa.com/article/news/local/1-dead-after-shootingat-college-grad-party-in-arlington-police-say/287-64ec5596-d9f8-4c86-addb-6b00d3511033
[https://perma.cc/Q2TQ-PQDF].
91
See, e.g., Henry J. Steadman et al., Violence by People Discharged from Acute Psychiatric
Inpatient Facilities and by Others in the Same Neighborhoods, 55 ARCHIVES GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 393, 400 (1998) (stating that results from one study site showed that rates of
violence were the same among individuals with mental disorders and those without when
neither group abused substances: “Substance abuse significantly raised the prevalence of
violence in both patient and community samples”).
92
Id. at 394-95.
93
Id. at 400. The study also found that individuals with both a mental illness and a substance
abuse disorder were more likely to be violent than their substance-abusing neighbors, and that
individuals with mental illness were more likely to abuse substances than their neighbors. Id.
94
See Emma E. McGinty & Daniel W. Webster, Gun Violence and Serious Mental Illness,
in GUN VIOLENCE AND MENTAL ILLNESS 8 (Liza H. Gold & Robert I. Simon eds., 2016)
(“One interpretation of the MacArthur study’s findings is that these socioeconomic and
environmental influences on violence are stronger than the effects of mental illness on
violence, in effect overpowering the relationship between serious mental illness and violence
observed in the ECA study.”).
95
Steadman et al., supra note 91, at 401.
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Researchers looked at the study population in ten-week increments
over the course of a year. In any given ten-week period, somewhere between
4% and 5.7% of the sample population that did not also have substance abuse
symptoms committed an act of violence.96 The community group reported a
3.3% rate of violence for a ten-week period, a difference that was not
statistically significant.97
The story shifted when substance abuse symptoms were taken into
account. For the sample population, the highest rates of violence were seen
in the initial ten-week period after release from the hospital, where twentytwo percent of substance-abusing former patients committed an act of
violence.98 In the least-violent ten-week period, 6.1% of the same group acted
violently. 99 But the community sample of individuals who exhibited
substance abuse symptoms also acted more violently than the community
group without such symptoms, with 11.1% committing a violent act in the
ten weeks before the researcher interview.100 The researchers concluded that
there was a statistically significant difference between the study sample and
the neighborhood sample in the rates of violence among the groups abusing
drugs or alcohol in the first ten-week period after release, but not for any of
the other time periods.101
Thus, without substance abuse symptoms, psychiatric patients were
no more likely to be violent than their neighbors. With substance abuse
symptoms, violence rates skyrocketed both among both psychiatric patients
and their neighbors. The authors concluded that “discharged mental patients”
were not a homogeneous population and rates of violence varied considerably
between those who abused substances and those who did not.102
Later analysis of the group of patients who acted violently found that
most of these acts did not involve use of a gun, and that those individuals who
did use a gun were much more likely to have prior arrests or substance abuse
problems than the rest of the discharged patient study group.103 Only two
percent of the former patients used a gun in a violent act.104 Of that small
group, only two of the patients had not been previously arrested, an arrest rate
96

Id. at 399 tbl.5. The researchers defined “violence” to mean an act causing injury,
including both use of weapons and the threat of using a weapon. Id. at 395.
97
Id. at 399 tbl.5.
98
Id. at 399.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id. at 393.
103
Henry J. Steadman et al., Gun Violence and Victimization of Strangers by Persons with a
Mental Illness: Data from the MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study, 66 PSYCHIATRIC
SERV. 1238, 1239-40 (2015).
104
Id. at 1239.
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twice as high as the overall patient sample.105 Almost all of the discharged
patients who committed gun violence had been admitted to the hospital
with either an alcohol (seventy-four percent) or drug abuse (fifty-two
percent) diagnosis; these rates are again over twice as high as the overall
discharged patient group.106
Other studies using the MacArthur data set examined whether certain
characteristics among the study population raised the risk of violent acts: one
analyzed access to firearms and another looked at specific mental health
symptoms.107 In the first study, researchers found that while having access to a
firearm increased the risk of violence both among former patients and among
community members, the former patients with firearms access were no more
likely to use those guns violently than others in the community with the same
access.108 But while patient status had no effect on rates of violence, drug abuse
was highly correlated with an increased risk.109 The authors concluded that gun
violence among those with mental illness is extraordinarily rare outside of the
risk factors that predict violence among the general population.110
The second study analyzed whether delusions were positively
associated with violent acts.111 It found that people in the study group who
lived with delusions were no more likely to be violent than nondelusional
people.112 With some types of delusions—such as a belief that your body or
mind was being controlled by someone else—the rates of violence were
actually lower than for nondelusional subjects.113 The study instead found
that, for both delusional and nondelusional subjects, imagined violence—
thinking about hurting other people—was associated with an uptick in actual
violence.114
This research debunks many assumptions about links between mental
illness and violence: that delusional thoughts prompt violent behavior, that
individuals with mental illness would use weapons violently if given access
to them, and that individuals with mental illness are more violent than others
in the same neighborhoods. The MacArthur studies raise serious questions as
to whether any of these things are true.
105

Id. at 1239-40.
Id.
107
Paul S. Appelbaum et al., Violence and Delusions: Data from the MacArthur Violence
Risk Assessment Study, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 566, 568 (2000); Baumann & Teasdale,
supra note 25, at 46.
108
Baumann & Teasdale, supra note 25, at 48.
109
Id. at 47-48.
110
Id. at 48.
111
Appelbaum et al., supra note 107, at 566.
112
Id.
113
Id. at 568.
114
Id. at 569.
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Earlier studies using different methodologies did find more of a link
between mental illness and violence, confusing the picture somewhat.115 The
differences between these results and the MacArthur results could be entirely
accounted for by differences in methodology, such as the different definitions
of violence or different methods of populating the subject groups.116 But even
putting aside these differences, pre-MacArthur studies showed mental illness
was only weakly correlated with violence and was not the driver of the vast
majority of violence in the United States.
In one of the largest of these studies, the Epidemiologic Catchment
Area (ECA) study, researchers assessed the prevalence of mental disorders
and violence among residents of three American cities. 117 Unlike the
MacArthur study, the researchers did not rely solely on individuals who had
previously been hospitalized; they assessed symptoms of mental illness
among the over 18,000 respondents, drawn mainly from community
households but also from prisons, nursing homes, and psychiatric facilities.118
They did not compare these populations to others in the same neighborhoods,
but to those living in the sampled metropolitan areas.119
Researchers found a weak but statistically significant link between some
serious mental illnesses and violence. For example, around seven percent of
individuals suffering from schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, or major depression
had committed a violent act in the past year, as compared to two percent of
individuals without a mental illness or substance abuse disorder.120
As with the MacArthur study, abuse of substances led to a dramatic rise
in violent behavior. Over twenty-one percent of individuals with a substance
abuse disorder had committed an act of violence in the previous year.121
A few caveats to this finding that are relevant to the purposes of this
Article: First, the data did not differentiate between the severity of different
violent acts. A person who threw a plate at his wife or was in a physical
115
See generally McGinty & Webster, supra note 94, at 6-9 (surveying studies of “the
prevalence of violence among the population with mental illness”).
116
See Appelbaum et al., supra note 107, at 570-71. One example of the differences in
methodology: past studies had shown a small but significant relationship between delusions
and violence. These researchers had assessed delusional symptoms based on screening
questions; interviewers in the MacArthur study were instructed to probe further and assess
whether the subject was actually experiencing delusions, resulting in a smaller pool of
subjects classified as delusional. Id.
117
Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Violence and Psychiatric Disorder in the Community:
Evidence from the Epidemiologic Catchment Area Surveys, 41 HOSP. & COMMUNITY
PSYCHIATRY 761, 762 (1990).
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id. at 769.
121
Id. at 766.

Vol. 5:2]

Gun Laws and Mental Illness

23

fight while drinking without landing a punch was counted as “violent,” the
same as a subject who committed multiple murders.122 The statistic does not
mean that seven percent of individuals with serious mental illness shot or
even physically harmed another person.
Second, researchers also found that youth, male gender, and low
socioeconomic status all were linked to violent acts. 123 These factors were
correlated with higher rates of violence, regardless of whether the individual
was mentally ill. 124 Later studies supported the hypothesis that social and
economic factors, such as poverty, crime victimization, involvement with drugs
and drug markets, early life trauma, and neighborhood crime, may largely
account for the small links found between mental illness and violence.125
Regardless, given the small portion of the population that suffers from
serious mental illness, researchers estimated that only four percent of violent
crime in the United States was driven by mental illness alone.126 Or, put another
way, even if the government could somehow detain every person whose violent
acts were caused by mental illness before they acted, ninety-six percent of
violent acts would still occur.127 And this number included all violent acts, not
only violent acts with a gun. The narrative that the gun violence problem is
mainly a mental illness problem is not supported by these results.128
Given the weak, at best, links between mental illness and violence, a
diagnosis of mental illness tells us little about a person’s capacity to pick up
a gun and shoot another. Moreover, the relatively small number of people
who have a serious mental illness—at least as compared with individuals with
alcohol or drug abuse problems—means that even if there was some
predisposition to violence, they pose a relatively small risk overall.129 But, as
illustrated below, mental illness gun bans do little to capture the tiny subset
of individuals with mental illness who do pose a risk, and other factors, like
substance abuse or violent history, would better identify “dangerous”
individuals among this group.
122

Id. at 763.
Id. at 764.
124
Id. at 769.
125
Swanson et al., supra note 38, at 368-69.
126
Id. at 368.
127
Swanson et al., supra note 38, at 368; see also John S. Rozel & Edward P. Mulvey, The
Link Between Mental Illness and Firearm Violence: Implications for Social Policy and
Clinical Practice, 13 ANN. REV. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 445, 448 (2017) (“[E]ven if all of the
association between mental illness and violence could somehow be eliminated, we would
still have to confront 96% of the violence in the United States.”).
128
See Baumann & Teasdale, supra note 25, at 44 (“[T]here is little evidence to suggest that
mental illness contributes to >3–5% of all violent crime, and there is even less evidence to
suggest that mental illness is a primary cause of gun-involved crime, including homicide.”).
129
Swanson et al., supra note 117, at 769.
123
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THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE

The folly in mental illness gun bans is the assumption that keeping
guns out of the hands of individuals with mental illness who have come to
the attention of courts or medical professionals will meaningfully reduce gun
violence. It assumes we can point to those who have been found incompetent
or involuntarily committed to psychiatric hospitals and say, “Them. They are
the problem. The rest of us can be trusted with our guns.”
But the psychiatric literature provides little to no support for these
assumptions. These laws therefore fail at their goal of preventing guns from
getting into the hands of dangerous people because they define the prohibited
group in ways that both include many individuals who will never be violent
and exclude many individuals who pose a risk.
A. Federal Law
The federal mental illness gun ban has two pathways to prohibition.
First, one can be adjudicated “a mental defective.”130 I will set aside for the
moment the offensiveness of the term “mental defective”131 to focus on the
substance of these restrictions. Second, one can be committed to a mental
institution.132
1. Adjudicated as Mental Defective
Under federal law, one is “adjudicated as a mental defective” when a
court has found either that he “lacks the mental capacity to contract or manage
his own affairs” or “is a danger to himself or others.”133 It includes “a finding
of insanity by a court in a criminal case” and those “found incompetent to
stand trial or found not guilty by reason of lack of mental responsibility”
under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.134
130

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (2018) (“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been
adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental institution . . . to
possess . . . any firearm.”).
131
See generally Seen as Offensive, “Defective” Label for the Mentally Ill Lives on in the Federal
Code, FEDLINE (Jan. 5, 2014), http://fedline.federaltimes.com/2014/01/05/seen-as-outdated-andoffensive-label-for-the-mentally-ill-lives-on-in-the-federal-code/ [https://perma.cc/7MQB-M2ZV]
(noting the continued existence of the term “defective” in the United States Code despite its
offensive nature). Contrast this approach with the Supreme Court’s refusal to continue using
the term “mental retardation.” See Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 704 (2014) (using the term
“intellectual disability” instead of the term “mental retardation”).
132
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (2018).
133
27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (2019).
134
Id.
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The first barrier to entry here is “adjudicated.” To fit within this
definition, individuals must have come into contact with a court system or
other adjudicative body in some way.135 This requirement excludes the vast
majority of individuals who go on to commit mass shootings, many of whom
had no contact with the mental health or judicial systems before their
attack.136 Both James Holmes and Jared Loughner showed clear symptoms of
mental illness before their shootings, but had not been adjudicated as such.137
Just as problematically, the individuals the statute does capture are
often not the ones most likely to act violently. To be adjudicated incompetent
to stand trial, for example, one must be unable to understand the proceedings
or communicate with her attorney.138 Not every defendant who suffers from
mental illness will meet these criteria.139 In fact, only a small proportion of
defendants who show signs of mental illness are found incompetent each year.140
And there is no inherent relationship between incompetence and
dangerousness. To be incompetent usually means to be seriously mentally ill,
and, as demonstrated above, serious mental illness is not associated with
violence in any meaningful way.141
135

See Franklin v. Sessions, 291 F. Supp. 3d 705, 714-15 (W.D. Pa. 2017) (noting that the
“plain meaning of ‘adjudicated’ connotes the involvement of a judicial decision-maker, the
resolution of a dispute after consideration of argument by the parties involved, and a
deliberative proceeding with some form of due process”).
136
See Vars, supra note 12, at 1639 (“The most fundamental shortcoming of diagnosis and
treatment-based restrictions is that they require a diagnosis or treatment. Millions of people
with mental illness are not diagnosed and do not receive treatment.”).
137
See supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text (describing how both Holmes and
Loughner showed signs of mental illness prior to their shootings).
138
See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (“[T]he test must be whether he
has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding—and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings against him.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
139
See, e.g., Anne Bowen Poulin, Strengthening the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Counsel,
28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1213, 1218 (2006) (characterizing the competence standard as a “low
baseline, focusing on the bare essentials of the defendant’s involvement at trial”).
140
See, e.g., Susan McMahon, Reforming Competence Restoration Statutes: An Outpatient
Model, 107 GEO. L.J. 601, 607 (2019) (stating that 10,000–12,000 defendants are found
incompetent annually, while 50,000–60,000 defendants are referred for competency
assessments annually (citing CURT R. BARTOL & ANNE M. BARTOL, PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW:
RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 105 (2015))).
141
See Lauren Kois et al., Competency to Stand Trial Among Female Inpatients, 37 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 231, 232, 235 (2012) (noting that “defendants with a psychotic disorder,
relative to a nonpsychotic disorder, were eight times more likely to be opined incompetent”
and, among female inpatients, defendants with psychotic symptoms were twenty-nine times
more likely to be found incompetent); see also Debra A. Pinals, Where Two Roads Meet:
Restoration of Competence to Stand Trial from a Clinical Perspective, 31 NEW ENG. J. ON
CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 81, 84 (2005) (noting that “common symptoms of mental illness
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Even if a future mass shooter did find themselves before a judge at
some point, not every adjudication results in a finding that an individual is a
“mental defective.”142 Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, for example, had been
arrested for stealing electronics out of a car before they killed thirteen people
at Columbine High School.143 Neither was found incompetent or insane.144
Far from it. They were instead referred to a diversion program that kept
young, promising, first-time offenders out of the legal system.145
But if a person living with mental illness does come within the ambits
of the court system, he can be adjudicated a mental defective in two ways.
First, one is a mental defective if he “lacks the capacity to contract or manage
his own affairs.” 146 The few cases to have addressed the meaning of this
language have used it to signify the court appointment of a guardian to
provide for the individual’s needs.147 There is no indication that appointment
of a guardian is correlated with violence; it is only correlated with severe
mental illness, which is not itself an indicator of danger.148 This criterion is
overinclusive to the point of irrelevance.
“A danger to himself or others,” the second possible means of being
adjudicated as a “mental defective,” is more closely aligned with the goals of
violence prevention, but not by much. There are three problems with this
criterion. First, mental health professionals, on whose opinions judges rely
when making these decisions, are notoriously terrible at predicting danger
and often overestimate an individual’s future risk. 149 One review of the
literature found three central facts to be true: (1) mental health practitioners
associated with findings of incompetence and leading to hospitalization include delusions
(i.e., false, fixed beliefs), disorganized thoughts, and agitation”). Moreover, individuals
found incompetent have not been convicted of any crime and may, in fact, be factually
innocent of the accusations.
142
See, e.g., State v. Buchanan, 924 A.2d 422, 424 (N.H. 2007) (finding that even a criminal
defendant found incompetent to stand trial may not qualify as “adjudicated as a mental
defective” because incompetence does not equate with either dangerousness or lacking
mental capacity to contract or manage his own affairs).
143
DAVE CULLEN, COLUMBINE 202 (2009).
144
Id.
145
Id. at 214, 217.
146
27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (2019).
147
See Petramala v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. CV-10-2002-PHX-FJM, 2011 WL 3880826,
at *1 (D. Ariz. Sept. 2, 2011) (“[T]he court found that plaintiff is an incapacitated person as
defined by statute and that the appointment of a guardian and conservator is necessary to
provide for his demonstrated needs.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
148
See id. at *2 (noting that a finding that the defendant is a danger to himself or others is
not necessary to classify the defendant as mentally defective).
149
McMahon, supra note 140, at 635; see, e.g., JOHN MONAHAN, PREDICTING VIOLENT
BEHAVIOR: AN ASSESSMENT OF CLINICAL TECHNIQUES 77 (1981) (finding that when
psychiatrists and psychologists predict violent behavior three times, they are only correct for
one of those three predictions).
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“inaccurately make future violence predictions,” (2) they “lack training in
making violence predictions,” and (3) their dangerousness predictions “are
biased by their reliance on a number of cognitive heuristics, which causes
them to overestimate rates of future violence.”150
Second, even without the uncertainty introduced by the experts,
dangerousness is a pliable concept that can vary considerably among
jurists. The term is elastic and poorly defined, leaving much room for both
bias and misapplication.151 As one judge noted, his decisions on whether
an individual posed a threat of harm “were inevitably based upon my
personal values and standards.”152
Third, statutes defining “danger to self or others” often include
indicators well beyond a risk of future violence or suicide. In some states, a
lack of nourishment or self-care, or unwillingness to seek medical care,
qualifies as a danger to self.153 Some states go so far as to include the prospect
150

Daniel A. Krauss & Bruce D. Sales, The Effects of Clinical and Scientific Expert Testimony
on Juror Decision Making in Capital Sentencing, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 267, 280-81
(2001); see also Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 324 (1993) (“[M]any psychiatric predictions of
future violent behavior by the mentally ill are inaccurate.”). But as Mulvey explains:
[C]linicians indeed demonstrate some appreciable accuracy in assessing
the likelihood of future violence in individuals with mental illness.
However, this does not mean that clinicians are infallible or even that their
conclusions are highly accurate in most situations. Rather, it only means
that clinical judgments add a moderate amount of valid information to
other factors known about the case.
Edward P. Mulvey, Assessing the Likelihood of Future Violence in Individuals with Mental
Illness: Current Knowledge and Future Issues, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 629, 632 (2005); see also
Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise Redux, 56 EMORY L.J. 275, 283, 291
(2006) (noting that success rates can only be fairly assessed by comparing the likelihood of
accurate prediction to chance, and that a fifty percent accuracy rate could be far more
accurate than a random assignment).
151
See, e.g., MICHAEL PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 2A-4.2,
cmt. (2d ed. 1998) (dangerousness remains “misunderstood, and poorly defined and
conceptualized”).
152
William M. Brooks, The Tail Still Wags the Dog: The Pervasive and Inappropriate
Influence by the Psychiatric Profession on the Civil Commitment Process, 86 N.D. L. REV.
259, 295 (2010) (quoting Judge Sees Lack of Guidelines for Committing Mental Patients,
N.Y. L.J., Nov. 27, 1987, at 1).
153
See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2946(f)(3) (West, Westlaw through laws effective on or before
July 1, 2019, enacted during 2019 Reg. Sess.) (defining “likely to cause harm to self or
others” as including “substantially unable . . . to provide for any of the person’s basic needs”);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A.011(2) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. & 2019 1st
Extraordinary Sess.) (defining “danger” to include “actions which deprive self, family, or
others of the basic means of survival, including provision for reasonable shelter, food and
clothing”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 1 (West, Westlaw through ch. 88 of 2019 1st
Ann. Sess.) (defining “likelihood of serious harm” to include “a very substantial risk of
physical impairment or injury to the person himself as manifested by evidence the person’s
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judgment is so affected that he is unable to protect himself in the community”); MISS. CODE
ANN. §§ 41-21-73(4), 41-21-61(f) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.) (defining
“substantial likelihood of physical harm” to include “a failure to provide necessary food,
clothing, shelter, or medical care for himself”); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 632.350(5), 632.005(10)
(West, Westlaw through 2019 1st Reg. & 1st Extraordinary Sess. of the 100th Gen.
Assembly) (defining “likelihood of serious harm” to include “inability to provide for his
basic necessities of food, clothing, shelter, safety, or medical or mental health care”); NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 71-925(1), 71-908 (West, Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. of 106th Leg.
(2019)) (defining “substantial risk of serious harm” to include “evidence of inability to
provide for his or her basic human needs, including food, clothing, shelter, essential medical
care, or personal safety”); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 433A.310(1), 433A.115(2) (LEXIS
through 80th Reg. Sess., including all legislation effective May 28, 2019 or earlier) (defining
“clear and present danger of harm” to include “[inability] to satisfy his or her need for
nourishment, personal or medical care, shelter, self-protection, or safety”); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 135-C:34, 135-C:27(1) (West, Westlaw through ch. 346 of the 2019 Reg. Sess.)
(defining “danger to himself” as including “lack [of] capacity to care for his own welfare
[such] that there is a likelihood of death, serious bodily injury, or serious debilitation”); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4-27.2(m), 30:4-27.2(h) (West, Westlaw through L. 2019, c. 267 and J.R.
No. 22) (defining “dangerous to self” to include behaviors that indicate “the person is unable
to satisfy his need for nourishment, essential medical care or shelter”); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§
43-1-11(E), 43-1-3(M) (West, Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. of the 54th Leg. (2019))
(defining “likelihood of serious harm to oneself” to include “grave passive neglect”); N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 122C-268(j), 122C-3(11) (West, Westlaw through S.L. 2019-238 of the
Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.) (defining “dangerous to self” to mean that the individual
would be unable to “exercise self-control, judgment, and discretion in the conduct of his
daily responsibilities and social relations, or to satisfy the individual’s need for nourishment,
personal or medical care, shelter, or self-protection and safety”); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§
25-03.1-07, 25-03.1-02(14), (21) (West, Westlaw through legislation effective through Jan.
1, 2020, from the 66th Gen. Assemb.) (defining “serious risk of harm” to mean “substantial
deterioration in physical health, or substantial injury, disease, or death, based upon recent
poor self-control or judgment in providing one’s shelter, nutrition, or personal care”); 50 PA.
STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7304(a), 7301(b) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.
Act 87) (defining “clear and present danger” to mean that person is “unable . . . to satisfy his
need for nourishment, personal or medical care, shelter, or self-protection and safety”); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS §§ 27A-1-2, 27A-1-1(7) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Sess. Laws, Exec.
Order 19-1 and Sup. Ct. Rule 19-18) (defining “danger to self” to include “an inability to
provide for some basic human needs such as food, clothing, shelter, essential medical care,
or personal safety, or by arrests for criminal behavior”); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 62A-15631(16), 62A-15-602(18) (West, Westlaw through 2019 1st Spec. Sess.) (defining
“substantial danger” to include the incapability “of providing the basic necessities of life,
including food, clothing, and shelter”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 7611, 7101(17) (West,
Westlaw through Acts of Reg. Sess. of the 2019-2020 Vt. Gen. Assemb. (2019)) (defining
“danger of harm to himself or herself” as including inability “to satisfy his or her need for
nourishment, personal or medical care, shelter, or self-protection and safety”); W. VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 27-5-4(k), 27-1-12(a)(5) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. with law of the
2019 1st Extraordinary Sess. approved through Aug. 7, 2019) (defining “likely to cause
serious harm” as including inability “to satisfy his or her need for nourishment, medical care,
shelter or self-protection and safety”); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 51.20(1)(a)(1), 51.20(1)(a)(2)
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of deteriorating mental health as a danger to oneself.154 In these jurisdictions,
violence need not be on the horizon for one to be labeled dangerous.
2. Committed to a Mental Institution
The second path to disqualification, “committed to a mental
institution,” is in most ways coextensive with “adjudicated as a mental
defective.” This is in large part because many jurisdictions require either a
judicial or quasi-judicial commitment proceeding and exclude from the
definition individuals who were hospitalized on a temporary or emergency
basis from the definition. 155 A defendant who is committed to a mental
institution by a court because he poses a danger to himself or others, one
criterion for commitment in nearly every state,156 qualifies both under this
(West, Westlaw through 2019 Act 5, published May 4, 2019) (defining “dangerous” as
including an inability “to satisfy basic needs for nourishment, medical care, shelter or
safety”); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-10-110(j), 25-10-101(a)(ii) (West, Westlaw through 2019
Gen. Sess. of Wyo. Leg.) (defining “dangerous to himself or others” to include an inability
“to satisfy basic needs for nourishment, essential medical care, shelter or safety”).
154
See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE. §§ 25-03.1-07, 25-03.1-02(14), (21).
155
See Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff's Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 681-82 (6th Cir. 2016) (en banc)
(stating that § 922(g)(4) “applies only to persons who are involuntarily committed by an
appropriate judicial authority following due process safeguards”); United States v.
Rehlander, 666 F.3d 45, 50 (1st Cir. 2012) (“[A] temporary hospitalization under section
3863 does not constitute a ‘commitment’ under section 922”); United States v. Giardina, 861
F.2d 1334, 1337 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that there is nothing in § 922(g) which indicates an
intent to prohibit the possession of firearms by persons who had been hospitalized for
observation and examination where they were found not to be mentally ill and were not
committed); United States v. Hansel, 474 F.2d 1120, 1122-23 (8th Cir. 1973) (finding the same).
156
ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 47.30.755(a) (West, Westlaw through Nov. 27, 2019 of the 2019
1st Reg. Sess. & 2019 1st Spec. Sess. of the 31st Leg.); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-540(A)
(West, Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. of the 54th Leg. (2019)); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 5250 (West, Westlaw through ch. 870 of the 2019 Reg. Sess.); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
27-65-109(4) (West, Westlaw through the 2019 Reg. Sess.); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a498(c) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Jan. Reg. Sess. and the 2019 July Spec. Sess.); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 394.467(1) (West, Westlaw through 2019 1st Reg. Sess. of the 26th Leg.); GA.
CODE ANN. § 37-3-1(9.1) (West, Westlaw through acts passed during the 2019 Sess. of the
Gen. Assemb.); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 334-60.2 (West, Westlaw through Act 286 of the
2019 Reg. Sess.); IDAHO CODE § 66-329(11) (West, Westlaw through 2019 1st Reg. Sess. of
the 65th Idaho Leg.); 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-119 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 101592); IND. CODE ANN. § 12-26-6-8(a) (West, Westlaw through 2019 1st Reg. Sess. of the
121st Gen. Assemb.); IOWA CODE ANN. § 229.1(20) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg.
Sess.); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2946(f) (West, Westlaw through laws effective on or before
July 1, 2019, enacted during the 2019 Reg. Sess. of the Kan. Leg.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
202A.026 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. & 2019 1st Reg. Sess.); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 28:55(E)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
123, § 1 (West, Westlaw through ch. 88 of 2019 1st Ann. Sess.); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
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prong of the definition and as being adjudicated as a “mental defective.” The
under- and over-inclusiveness problems identified in the previous Section
also apply here.
But the “committed to a mental institution” definition also often captures
a person who may be committed because he is “gravely disabled.”157 Depending
§ 330.1401.(1) (West, Westlaw through P.A.2019, No. 131, of the 2019 Reg. Sess., 100th
Leg.); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-21-73(4), 41-21-61(f) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg.
Sess.); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 632.350(5), 632.005(10) (West, Westlaw through 2019 1st Reg.
& 1st Extraordinary Sess. of the 100th Gen. Assemb.); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-126(1)
(West, Westlaw through 2019 Sess.); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 71-925(1), 71-908 (West,
Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. of the 106th Leg. (2019)); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 433A.310(1),
433A.115(2) (LEXIS through 80th Reg. Sess.); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 135-C:34, 135C:27(1) (Westlaw through ch. 346 of the 2019 Reg. Sess.); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4-27.2(m),
30:4-27.2(h) (West, Westlaw through L. 2019, c. 267 and J.R. No. 22); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§
43-1-11(E), 43-1-3(M) (West, Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. of the 54th Leg. (2019)); N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 122C-268(j), 122C-3(11) (West, Westlaw through S.L. 2019-238 of the
Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 25-03.1-07, 25-03.1-02(14),
(21) (West, Westlaw through legislation effective through Jan. 1, 2020, from the 66th Gen.
Assemb.); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5122.15(C), 5122.01(B) (West, Westlaw through Files
1 to 18 of the 133d Gen. Assemb. (2019-2020)); 50 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§
7304(a), 7301 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. Act 87); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-17580(A) (West, Westlaw through the 2019 Sess.); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 27A-1-2, 27A-11(6)-(7) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Sess. Laws, Exec. Order 19-1 & Sup. Ct. Rule 1918); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 574.034(a) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg.
Sess. of the 86th Leg.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-15-631(16) (West, Westlaw through 2019
1st Spec. Sess.); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 7611, 7101(17) (West, Westlaw through Acts of
Reg. Sess. of the 2019-2020 Vt. Gen. Assemb. (2019)); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-817(C)
(West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.240(3) (West,
Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. of the Wash. Leg.); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 27-5-4(k), 271-12(a) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. with law of the 2019 1st Extraordinary
Sess. approved through Aug. 7, 2019); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 51.20(1)(a)(1), 51.20(1)(a)(2)
(West, Westlaw through 2019 Act 5, published May 4, 2019); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-10110(j), 25-10-101(a)(ii) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Gen. Sess. of Wyo. Leg.).
157
See Donald H. Stone, Confine Is Fine: Have the Non-Dangerous Mentally Ill Lost Their
Right to Liberty?, 20 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 323, 325 (2012) (noting that forty-two states
have criteria broader than dangerousness that include either a “grave disability” or “need for
treatment”); see also ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 47.30.755(a); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36540(A); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5250; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-65-109(4); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-498(c); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 66-329(11); IND. CODE ANN. § 12-266-8(a); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:55(E)(1); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.05.240(3). For
examples of these broad criteria, see MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1401.(1) (allowing
commitment for an individual who “is unable to attend to his or her basic physical needs
such as food, clothing, or shelter”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-126(1) (allowing
commitment when the individual “is substantially unable to provide for the respondent’s own
basic needs of food, clothing, shelter, health, or safety”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-17-580(A)
(allowing commitment when the individual “lacks sufficient insight or capacity to make
responsible decisions with respect to his treatment”); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §
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on the definition adopted by the state, “gravely disabled” can capture a
larger swath of people than those deemed dangerous or unable to manage
their own affairs.158 Indiana, for example, defines “gravely disabled” to
include any individual who, as a result of mental illness, is in danger of
coming to harm because he “has a substantial impairment or obvious
deterioration of that individual’s judgment, reasoning, or behavior that
results in the individual’s inability to function independently.”159
The breadth of that definition could include any individual who is
in an acute phase of mental illness. Under this standard, one court upheld
the commitment of an individual with mental illness who had lived on her
own and held steady employment. 160 But she refused medication with
lithium and had arrived at the hospital in a manic state. 161 The court
committed her because “A.R. has a documented history of mental illness
and would benefit from the medications prescribed to her, but she has
failed or refused to either take the medications or take them in the manner
prescribed.”162
In some states, “gravely disabled” even includes individuals not
currently symptomatic but who have given some indication that they will
not comply with medication in the future. In Alaska, for example, a
gravely disabled person is one who will “suffer . . . severe abnormal,
emotional, or physical distress, and this distress is associated with
significant impairment of judgment, reason, or behavior causing a
substantial deterioration of the person’s previous ability to function
independently.” 163 This standard included a man who the trial court
described as a “very nice person” and who, after treatment, had returned
to being a “functioning human being” after being catatonic upon his
admission to the hospital. 164 But his doctor testified that he probably
would not take his medication in the future; as a result, the court ordered
him committed as “gravely disabled.”165
These individuals had no records of violence. They did nothing
more than fail to take their prescribed medication or indicate that they may
574.034(a) (allowing commitment when the defendant is experiencing “deterioration” in the
ability to “function independently,” exhibited by an inability to provide for “basic needs,
including food, clothing, health, or safety,” among other requirements).
158
See Stone, supra note 157, at 325.
159
IND. CODE ANN. § 12-7-2-96.
160
Civil Commitment of A.R. v. Clarian Health Partners, Inc., No. 49A05-1011-MH-665,
2011 WL 2472781 (Ind. Ct. App. Jun. 22, 2011).
161
Id. at *1.
162
Id. at *3.
163
ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 47.30.915(9)(B).
164
In re Jeffrey E., 281 P.3d 84, 88 (Alaska 2012).
165
Id. at 88-89.

32

Journal of Law & Public Affairs

[Jan. 2020

not do so in the future. 166 Yet they, too, are captured by the federal
firearms restrictions.
B. Broader Restrictions in Individual States
Several states either track the language of the federal statute or largely
capture the same groups of individuals as the federal statute in their firearms
possession laws.167 A few go further and ban a broader spectrum of individuals
166

See Stone, supra note 157, at 325-26 (“[The gravely disabled] criteria give judges broad
discretion to make civil commitment decisions and overvalue the role of medication
adherence in the treatment of mental illness.”).
167
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3101(7), 13-3102(4) (West, Westlaw through 1st Reg.
Sess. of the 54th Leg. (2019)) (prohibiting possession for one who has been found to be a
danger to himself or others pursuant to court order; allowing for restoration of firearms
possession); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-103(a) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. of the
92d Ark. Gen. Assemb.) (forbidding possession of a firearm for individuals who have been
adjudicated mentally ill or involuntarily committed to a mental institution); CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 8103 (West, Westlaw through ch. 870 of the 2019 Reg. Sess.) (allowing
firearms possession when a person has received a certificate stating person may possess a
firearm without endangering others); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-217c (West, Westlaw
through 2019 Jan. Reg. Sess. & 2019 July Spec. Sess.) (barring individuals who either have
been found not guilty due to a mental defect or have been confined in a mental hospital within
the proceeding sixty months by order of a probate court); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1448
(West) (West, Westlaw through ch. 219 of the 150th Gen. Assemb. (2019-2020)) (barring
individuals involuntarily committed, or, for crimes of violence, found not guilty by reason
of insanity, or found incompetent to stand trial, but allowing such individuals to petition for
relief from the prohibition); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 790.064(1), 790.065(2) (West, Westlaw
through 2019 1st Reg. Sess. of the 26th Leg.) (barring individuals who have been adjudicated
mental defective or committed to a mental institution from possessing a firearm unless relief
is obtained); IOWA CODE ANN. § 724.15(1)(c) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.)
(prohibiting permits for those barred from firearms possession by federal law); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-6301(9) (West, Westlaw through laws effective on or before July 1, 2019, enacted
during the 2019 Reg. Sess. of the Kan. Leg.) (defining criminal use of weapons to include
“selling, giving or otherwise transferring any firearm to any person who is or has been a
mentally ill person subject to involuntary commitment”); 15 ME. REV. STAT. § 393 (West,
Westlaw through 2019 1st Reg. Sess. & ch. 531 of 1st Spec. Sess. of the 129th Leg.) (barring
ownership, possession, or control when the individual “has been found not criminally
responsible by reason of insanity” for certain enumerated crimes); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 28.422(3)(f)-(h) (West, Westlaw through P.A.2019, No. 131, of the 2019 Reg. Sess., 100th
Leg.) (prohibiting issuance of a license to purchase or carry firearms when the person is
under an order of involuntary commitment, inpatient or outpatient, or he has been adjudicated
legally incapacitated); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.713(3), subd. 4 (West, Westlaw through
legislation effective through Jan. 1, 2020 from the 2019 Reg. & 1st Spec. Sess.) (allowing
for restoration of ability to possess a firearm); MO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571.070 (West,
Westlaw through 2019 1st Reg. and 1st Extraordinary Sess. of the 100th Gen. Assemb.)
(prohibiting firearms possession for those “currently adjudged mentally incompetent”); NEV.
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with mental illness from owning guns.168 Hawaii, for example, bars anyone who
REV. STAT. ANN. § 202.360(2) (West, Westlaw through 80th Reg. Sess. (2019)); N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 400.00(1) (McKinney 2019); N.C. GEN STAT. ANN. § 14-404(c) (West, Westlaw
through S.L. 2019-238 of the Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.) (preventing individuals who
have been adjudicated mentally incompetent or have been committed to any mental
institution from being issued permits to purchase or receive handguns); N.D. CENT. CODE
ANN. §§ 62.1-02-01(1), 62.1-02-01.2 (West, Westlaw through legislation effective through
Jan. 1, 2020, from the 66th Gen. Assemb.) (allowing for petitions for relief from prohibition);
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 166.250(1) (LEXIS through 2019 Reg. Sess.) (prohibiting possession
if individual was committed to Oregon Health Authority or was found to be a person with
mental illness and “subject to an order . . . that the person be prohibited from purchasing or
possessing firearms as a result of that mental illness”); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 6105(c) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. Act 87) (prohibiting possession for any
person who has been adjudicated as mentally incompetent or involuntarily committed to a
mental institution for inpatient treatment); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-23-30 (Westlaw through the
2019 Sess.) (barring sale or transfer of handguns rather than possession, but capturing the
same individuals as federal law); id. § 44-23-1080 (barring possession of all firearms by
individuals under the jurisdiction of the S.C. Department of Mental Health); VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 18.2-308.1:2(A), 18.2-308.1:3(A) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.) (barring
individuals who are found to be mentally incompetent or mentally incapacitated, or who have
been involuntarily committed to a mental facility, from possessing a firearm); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9.41.040 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. of the Wash. Leg.)
(prohibiting possession by individuals found not guilty by reason of insanity or involuntarily
committed, but allowing individuals to petition for relief from the ban); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 61-7-7(a)(4) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. with law of the 2019 1st
Extraordinary Sess. approved through Aug. 7, 2019) (preventing persons who have been
adjudicated as mentally incompetent or who have been involuntarily committed to a mental
institution from possessing a firearm and requiring immediate surrender of firearms once
either circumstance occurs); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 941.29(1m), 51.20(13)(cv)1 (West,
Westlaw through 2019 Act 5, published May 4, 2019); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-8-404(c)-(d)
(West, Westlaw through 2019 Gen. Sess. of the Wyo. Leg.) (requiring that, in order to
lawfully possess or purchase a firearm, a person must not currently be deemed legally
incompetent and not have been committed to a mental institution).
Some other states limit their mental health-related restrictions only to the issuance
of permits to carry concealed handguns. See generally LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1379.3
(Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 69-2433 (West, Westlaw
through 1st Reg. Sess. of the 106th Leg. (2019)); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-19-4 (West, Westlaw
through 1st Reg. Sess. of the 54th Leg. (2019)); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.125 (West,
Westlaw through Files 1 to 18 of the 133d Gen. Assemb. (2019-2020)); TENN. CODE ANN. § 3917-1351 (West, Westlaw through 2019 1st Extraordinary Sess. of the 111th Tenn. Gen.
Assemb.); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.172 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. of the
86th Leg.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-5-704 (West, Westlaw through 2019 1st Spec. Sess.).
168
I note below the ways in which these statutes expand upon the federal prohibition. Unless
otherwise noted, these statutes also capture those groups prohibited from possessing a
firearm by federal law. ALA. CODE 1975 § 13A-11-72(a) (Westlaw through Act 2019-540)
(stating that “[n]o person . . . of unsound mind shall own a firearm or have one in his or her
possession or under his or her control”); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 8100(a) (West,
Westlaw through ch. 870 of 2019 Reg. Sess.) (barring individuals who have been “admitted
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“[i]s or has been diagnosed as having a significant behavioral, emotional, or
mental disorder” from possessing a gun.169
Only a prohibition this broad could have prevented James Holmes
from purchasing guns. But forty-six percent of Americans have been
diagnosed with a mental illness at some point in their lives.170 Hawaii seems
to count them all as presumptively dangerous.171
From the perspective of preventing gun violence, the Hawaii approach is
closer to the ideal gun restriction, as it bars large portions of the population from
having guns. But the problem with the Hawaii statute is that it conditions
ownership on a lack of diagnosed mental illness. It does not say to everyone that
you cannot have a firearm. It says this only to those who have visited a psychiatrist
to a facility and [are] receiving inpatient treatment” whom the attending health professional
believes are a danger to themselves or others); D.C. Code Ann. § 7-2502.03(a)(6) (West,
Westlaw through Nov. 26, 2019) (barring individuals confined to a mental health facility
voluntarily or involuntarily within five-year period preceding application); HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 134-7(c) (West, Westlaw through Act 286 of 2019 Reg. Sess.) (barring possession
or control of firearms when the individual “is or has been diagnosed as having significant
behavioral, emotional, or mental disorders”); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/24-3.1(a) (West,
Westlaw through P.A. 101-592) (barring possession by individuals who have been a
patient in a mental institution within the past five years); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY §
5-133(b) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.) (barring
individuals who “suffer[] from a mental disorder . . .and [have] a history of violent
behavior against the person or another” or have “been voluntarily admitted for more than
30 consecutive days” to a mental health treatment facility); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
140, § 131 (West, Westlaw through ch. 88 of 2019 1st Ann. Sess.) (including individuals
who have been “committed to a hospital or institution for mental illness” with or without
a court order); MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-9-101(2) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.)
(including individuals who have been either voluntarily or involuntarily committed, but
limits restrictions to “stun guns, concealed weapons, or revolvers”); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2c:58-3(c) (West, Westlaw through L.2019, c. 267 and J.R. No. 22) (prohibiting issuance
of firearms purchase license if the individual has “ever been confined for a mental
disorder” unless person produces proof that he is no longer incapacitated); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 1289.12 (West, Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. of the 57th Leg. (2019))
(prohibiting sale or transfer of various firearms to “any individual who . . . is mentally or
emotionally unbalanced or disturbed”); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-47-6 (West, Westlaw
through ch. 310 of 2019 Reg. Sess.) (prohibiting individuals under “treatment” by virtue
of being mentally incompetent from possessing firearms).
169
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134-7(c)(3).
170
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, A STUDY OF THE PRE-ATTACK BEHAVIORS OF ACTIVE
SHOOTERS, supra note 41, at 17; see also Debra J. Brody et al., NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH
STATISTICS DATA, PREVALENCE OF DEPRESSION AMONG ADULTS AGED 20 AND OVER:
UNITED STATES, 2013–2016 1 (2018), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/databriefs/db303
.htm [https://perma.cc/AC4A-6XLH] (finding that eight percent of Americans suffered from
depression in any two-week period between 2013 and 2016).
171
That said, the statute does allow individuals with a past diagnosis to possess a gun when
they have been “medically documented to be no longer adversely affected by the . . . mental
disease, disorder, or defect.” HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134-7(c).
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and received a diagnosis, deeming them de facto dangerous, and thus further
cementing the association in the public mind between mental illness and violence.
*

*

*

To sum up, the mental illness gun bans of the states and the federal
government are tied to some concrete indicator of mental illness, be that a court
finding, a hospital commitment, or a diagnosis. By focusing on these tangible
indicia, these laws are vastly overinclusive and underinclusive. They call the
“nice” person who may not take his medication in the future too dangerous
to be trusted with firearms,172 but fail to capture Stephen Paddock,173 Omar
Mateen, 174 Adam Lanza, 175 Nikolas Cruz, 176 Jared Loughner, 177 James
Holmes,178 or many other mass shooters.179
A recent study of a law strengthening background checks bears out
the conclusion that these laws do little to stem gun violence.180 Connecticut
172

In re Jeffrey E., 281 P.3d 84, 88 (Alaska 2012).
Supra notes 18–24 and accompanying text.
174
Adam Goldman, Joby Warrick & Max Bearak, “He Was Not a Stable Person”: Orlando
Shooter Showed Signs of Emotional Trouble, WASH. POST (June 12, 2016), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/ex-wife-of-suspected-orlando-shooter-he-beat
-me/2016/06/12/8a1963b4-30b8-11e6-8ff7-7b6c1998b7a0_story.html
[https://perma.cc/8GSL-8PAC] (“Mateen had a blemish-free record when he applied for a
Florida license to carry concealed weapons and again when he legally purchased two
firearms . . . just a few days before the shootings.”).
175
See Alison Leigh Cowan, Adam Lanza’s Mental Problems ‘Completely Untreated’ Before
Newtown Shooting, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/22/
nyregion/before-newtown-shootings-adam-lanzas-mental-problems-completely-untreatedreport-says.html [https://perma.cc/DR8Q-T359] (citing a report by medical experts, which
found that Lanza’s mother refused medication and other treatments for her son before the
shooting and that made no mention of commitments to a mental health facility or
adjudications of mental illness).
176
See Phil McCausland, Florida Mental Health Agency Examined Cruz in 2016, Didn’t
Hospitalize Him, NBCNEWS.COM (Feb. 19, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/usnews/social-media-post-led-florida-agency-investigate-nikolas-cruz-2016-n849221 [https://
perma.cc/C9A3-ZLR9] (explaining that crisis workers chose not to hospitalize Cruz after
being called to perform a psychiatric evaluation on him).
177
See McCreary, supra note 12, at 819 (“Both Loughner and Holmes had previously shown
signs of mental illness . . . . Both Loughner and Holmes purchased their guns, seemingly
legally, from federally licensed firearms dealers.”).
178
Id.
179
The overwhelming majority of mass shooters obtain their guns legally and pass federal
background checks. See Bonnie Berkowitz et al., The Terrible Numbers that Grow with Each
Mass Shooting, WASH. POST (Dec. 10, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/
2018/national/mass-shootings-in-america/ [https://perma.cc/W27L-GHDN] (finding that, of
the 239 guns whose method of acquisition is known, 181, or seventy-five percent, were
obtained legally).
180
Swanson et al., supra note 38, at 373.
173
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enacted legislation to report gun-disqualifying mental health records to the
National Instant Criminal Background Check System in 2007. 181
Presumably, after this change, individuals who were disqualified under the
federal law would be unable to purchase a firearm at the point of sale; this
had not been true before this reporting change. But the law made little
difference to the violent crime rates. Researchers estimated that violent crime
among individuals with serious mental illness was reduced by less than onehalf of one percent.182
These laws thus do little to solve the problem of gun violence in
general or mass shootings in particular, and they only serve to put a legislative
stamp of approval on the stereotype of the dangerous “crazed lunatic.”183
III.

THE DANGEROUSNESS MYTH AND ITS HARMS

The problem with these laws, and with most calls for legislation
dealing with “mental health” in the wake of violent events, is that they are
based on bias, not reality. They target the anecdotal violent outlier with
mental illness while ignoring the many, many violent individuals who have
no mental health condition.
That bias is prevalent throughout our society; individuals with mental
illness are likely the most stigmatized group of people in the United States
today. The bias against them is on par with that held against individuals
because of their race, gender, or physical disabilities.184 Michael Perlin has
181

Id.
Id.
183
See Bacon & Jones, supra note 2. While my argument is a normative one, not a
constitutional one—my plea is for legislatures to repeal these statutes rather than courts to
strike them down—a strong argument can be made that these laws are unconstitutional as
applied. At least one circuit court has already taken steps towards invalidating these
provisions as a Second Amendment violation. See, e.g., Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s
Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 698 (6th Cir. 2016) (“Under intermediate scrutiny, a statute can
permissibly regulate more conduct (or more people) than necessary. However, the amount
of overreach must be reasonable, and it is the government’s burden, not Tyler’s, to prove that
§ 922(g)(4)’s ‘scope is in proportion to the interest served.’” (citations omitted)); see also
Keyes v. Lynch, 195 F. Supp. 3d 702, 722 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (finding § 922(g)(4) to violate
the Second Amendment because the plaintiff is “‘no more dangerous than a typical lawabiding citizen’ at this point in this life, and that he is not a ‘continuing threat’ to himself or
others” (citations omitted)).
184
See MICHAEL PERLIN, A PRESCRIPTION FOR DIGNITY: RETHINKING CRIMINAL JUSTICE
AND MENTAL DISABILITY LAW 17 (2013) (“‘Sanism’ is an irrational prejudice of the same
quality and character of other irrational prejudices [such as] racism, sexism, homophobia,
and ethnic bigotry . . . . Discrimination pervades the lives of people with psychiatric
diagnosis.”); Michael E. Waterstone & Michael Ashley Stein, Disabling Prejudice, 102 NW.
U. L. REV. 1351, 1364 (2008) (noting researchers have found that individuals with mental
disabilities experience “greater prejudice” than individuals with physical disabilities).
182
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described this bias as “sanism,” and has shown how it gives birth to several
deeply held myths about individuals with mental illness.185
One especially resonant myth is that individuals with mental health
conditions are dangerous. 186 A 2013 national survey found that forty-six
percent of Americans believed that persons with serious mental illness were,
“by far, more dangerous than the general population.”187 This is particularly
true of individuals with a psychotic disorder, like schizophrenia. In one study,
participants were read a vignette describing a person with schizophrenic
symptoms.188 Sixty percent of respondents reported that the individual was
somewhat likely, or very likely, to hurt others, even though the description
made no mention of violent behavior.189
The harm that this stigma does to individuals who suffer from mental
illness is physical, financial, social, and emotional. In a very real way, our
unquestioned link between violence and mental illness, as enshrined in and
furthered by our gun laws, makes an individual with mental illness more
likely to die from an interaction with police or while in jail, restricts him from
earning a living, undercuts support for public programs that could ease the
burden of living with mental illness, and discourages him from seeking
treatment for his condition.
First, the criminal justice implications. People experiencing
symptoms of mental illness are arrested by the police more often for the same
crimes than people who are not mentally ill.190 Police also tend to believe that
185
See PERLIN, supra note 184, at 17-24 (describing myths including not only the
dangerousness myth, but also myths such as that those living with mental illness are
presumptively incompetent to participate in “normal” activities, should be segregated in large,
distant institutions, do not exercise self-restraint, and are lazy, erratic, and morally deviant).
186
See Swanson et al., supra note 38, at 367 (“Negative public attitudes toward persons with
serious mental illnesses such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder are pervasive and
persistent in the United States, and the assumption of dangerousness is a key element of this
negative stereotype.”).
187
Colleen L. Barry et al., After Newtown—Public Opinion on Gun Policy and Mental
Illness, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1077, 1078-80 tbl.2 (2013).
188
Bernice A. Pescosolido et al., “A Disease Like Any Other”? A Decade of Change in
Public Reactions to Schizophrenia, Depression, and Alcohol Dependence, 167 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1321, 1322 (2010).
189
Id. at 1324.
190
See Patrick Corrigan, How Stigma Interferes with Mental Health Care, 59 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 614, 616 (2004) (discussing that “persons exhibiting signs and symptoms of
serious mental illness” face a greater likelihood of arrest by the police); Linda A. Teplin,
Criminalizing Mental Disorder: The Comparative Arrest Rate of the Mentally Ill, 39 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 794, 798-99 (1984) (finding that the probability of arrest was twenty percent
higher for individuals with symptoms of a mental disorder compared to those without such
symptoms); cf. JENNIFER BRONSON & MARCUS BERZOFSKY, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INDICATORS
OF MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS REPORTED BY PRISONERS AND JAIL INMATES, 2011–2012, at 1
(2017) (finding that forty-four percent of jail inmates had a history of a mental health problem).
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individuals with mental illness are more inclined to violence than others.191
This fear may lead to more aggressive reactions to the unpredictable
behaviors of individuals with mental illness.
Of the 986 people shot and killed by police in the United States in
2017, at least one in four had a mental health condition.192 An investigation
of police shootings in Portland, Maine, found that fifty-eight percent of those
shot and killed by police had a mental health condition. 193 Even when
encounters are not lethal, police use force disproportionately against
individuals with mental illness.194
Studies of these encounters have shown that police perceive
individuals with mental illness to be resisting officers at higher rates than
individuals without mental illness.195 It could be that these individuals are
actually engaging in these activities at higher rates; it could also be that police
officers believe them to be resisting arrest and acting disrespectfully, in part
because of the deep-seated societal fear of individuals with mental illness.196
Even if individuals with mental illness survive their encounters with
police, they then are enmeshed in the criminal justice system, where they are
more likely to be confined awaiting trial, more likely to be abused physically
191

See Dragana Kesic et al., Use of Nonfatal Force on and by Persons with Apparent Mental
Disorder in Encounters with Police, 40 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 321, 322 (2013) (noting that
despite few studies on the topic, “findings [suggest] that many police believe that dealing
with persons experiencing mental illness is dangerous because of their propensity for violent
behavior” (citations omitted)).
192
Fatal Force, WASH. POST (2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/
police-shootings-2017/ [https://perma.cc/R4K5-FYC8]; see also E. FULLER TORREY ET AL.,
TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR., JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDES BY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS:
WHAT IS THE ROLE OF MENTAL ILLNESS? 3 (2013) (summarizing a 2012 investigation, which
included hundreds of interviews and thousands of pages of documents, that concluded at least
half of the people shot and killed by police between 1980 and 2008 had mental health problems).
193
Deadly Force: Police and the Mentally Ill, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Dec. 8, 2012),
http://www.pressherald.com/special/Maine_police_deadly_force_series_Day_1.html [https:
//perma.cc/88DP-63RZ].
194
Michael T. Rossler & William Terrill, Mental Illness, Police Use of Force, and Citizen
Injury, 20 POLICE Q. 190, 199-200 (2016); see also Kesic et al., supra note 191, at 331
(finding that police in Victoria, Australia were twice as likely to use pepper spray against
those who appeared mentally disordered); Melissa Morabito et al., The Nature and Extent of
Police Use of Force in Encounters with People with Behavioral Health Disorders, 50 INT’L
J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 31, 34-35 (2015) (finding that individuals with a perceived mental illness
and/or substance abuse disorders were significantly more likely to have physical force used
against them than those with no perceived disorders).
195
See id. at 35 (finding that officers perceived resistance, aggressive resistance, or both in
70.71% of use-of-force encounters with individuals with perceived mental illness; officers
perceived individuals with no mental illness to resist 37.44% of the time).
196
See Kesic et al., supra note 191, at 322-23 (noting contrary findings on whether
individuals with mental illness acted more aggressively toward police than individuals
without mental illness).
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while awaiting trial, and more likely to die while awaiting trial.197 Just a few
examples of this: In New Mexico, defendants found incompetent to stand trial
were held before trial for more than a year longer than arrestees without
mental health conditions. 198 In South Carolina, guards used force against
inmates with mental illness 2.5 times more than against other inmates.199
Second, employment and housing prospects. Employers are less
likely to hire those with mental health conditions.200 This stigma is due, in
part, to the perception that those with mental illness are violent and
dangerous. 201 For example, a survey of business students found that, as
compared to other disabilities, mental illness produced greater discomfort
because the disorder was “seen as . . . threatening.”202 In a different study,
sixty-seven percent of employers expressed “discomfort” with hiring
someone who is taking antipsychotic medication. 203 One employer, when
discussing mental disability, stated, “you have a responsibility to other
employees to keep someone who might be unstable—that is, violent—from
hurting other employees.”204
Little research has been done on housing discrimination against
individuals with mental illness, but the studies so far have shown a similar
unwillingness to have individuals with mental illness in close proximity. For
example, in one study, prospective renters called landlords about advertised
apartments and, in some cases, alluded to a history of mental illness. Callers
who mentioned mental illness were three times as likely to be met with a
negative response.205 They received the same amount of negative responses

197

McMahon, supra note 140, at 613-17.
Id. at 610-11.
199
Id. at 615.
200
See Stijn Baert et al., First Depressed, then Discriminated Against?, 170 SOC. SCI. &
MED. 247, 253 (2016) (finding that, for individuals who disclose depression as the reason
for a year of unemployment, the probability of being asked for a job interview decreased by
about a third as compared to those who had no break in employment); cf. Teresa L. Scheid,
Stigma as a Barrier to Employment: Mental Disability and the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 28 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 670, 682 (2005) (finding that companies who did not
comply with ADA requirements on hiring individuals with mental disabilities were more
likely to hold stigmatizing attitudes toward people with mental illness).
201
Id. at 674. The stigma is borne of other false perceptions as well: that individuals with
mental illness are not only dangerous, but also “unpredictable, . . . irrational, slow, stupid,
and unreliable.” Id. at 673.
202
Id. at 674 (citing Gary L. Albrecht et al., Social Distance from the Stigmatized: A Test of
Two Theories, 16 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1319 (1982)).
203
Teresa L. Scheid, Employment of Individuals with Mental Disabilities: Business Response
to the ADA’s Challenge, 17 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 73, 87 (1999).
204
Id.
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Stewart Page, Effects of the Mental Illness Label in Attempts to Obtain Accommodation,
9 CANADIAN J. BEHAV. SCI. 85, 88 (1977).
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as callers who asked for information on behalf of an imprisoned brother.206
This hesitance is likely due to the fear of individuals with mental
illness. In one recent poll, when people were asked how they felt about an
individual with serious mental illness living next door to them, forty-seven
percent expressed discomfort with the idea.207
Community opposition to housing projects for individuals with
mental illness provides further anecdotal confirmation that these individuals
are feared as dangerous and face discrimination in housing as a result. While
opponents to such projects often cite supposedly neutral concerns such as
traffic or property values as the source of their protest, case studies indicate
that the concerns are more often driven by negative stereotypes, such as the
fear that residents with mental illness will become violent. For example, in
Great Britain, a new community residence was met with protestors carrying
signs that said “Paranoid Schizophrenic Out!” and “Keep Our Children
Safe!” 208 In New York, a concerned resident at a meeting for a planned
housing for people with mental illness asked, “Do we need to be concerned
that these people will be out for the day and just grab and stab someone?”209
Third, allocation of public resources. While this phenomenon has not
been studied extensively in the realm of mental health, at least one study
indicated that when the public fears people with mental illness or perceives
them as dangerous, they are less likely to support allocation of resources to
programs designed to help those individuals. 210 Perhaps as a result, less
money is spent on research of mental illness than on other health disorders.211
Treatment of mental health conditions is also drastically
underfunded. The budgets of public mental health facilities have been cut
and available bed space is woefully inadequate, which leaves many
206

Id. at 87-88.
Kaiser Health Tracking Poll: February 2013, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Feb.
27, 2013), https://www.kff.org/disparities-policy/poll-finding/kaiser-health-tracking-pollfebruary-2013/ [https://perma.cc/6F7R-39X8].
208
PHILIP T. YANOS, WRITTEN OFF: MENTAL HEALTH STIGMA AND THE LOSS OF HUMAN
POTENTIAL 51 (2018).
209
Id.
210
See Patrick Corrigan et al., An Attribution Model of Public Discrimination Towards
Persons with Mental Illness, 44 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 162, 172-73 (2003) (finding that
perceptions of dangerousness may result in support for coercive treatment and withholding
of help); Patrick Corrigan et al., Stigmatizing Attitudes about Mental Illness and Allocation
of Resources to Mental Health Services, 40 COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 297, 298 (2004)
(suggesting that prejudice against individuals with mental illness may result in less funding
for mental health services promoting independent living); see also Swanson et al., supra note
38, at 367 (“Public perceptions and attitudes towards persons with mental illness are
important to public policy, because people act on the basis of their beliefs, and they tend to
support policies that assume those beliefs and perceptions to be true.”).
211
PATRICK W. CORRIGAN, THE STIGMA EFFECT 53 (2018).
207
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symptomatic people locked out of mental health treatment altogether.212
Many psychiatrists and other mental health professionals also often opt
out of the public mental health care system, where most individuals with
severe mental illnesses are treated, leaving facilities understaffed and few
options for community care. 213 This is unsurprising; private health
systems are better funded than public ones, and their employees can earn
better salaries and benefits.214
Fourth, treatment-seeking behavior. Less than thirty percent of
individuals with a mental health condition attempt to treat it.215 Even those
who do seek treatment usually fail to adhere to their treatment regimens;
on average, more than forty percent of individuals receiving antipsychotic
medication failed to take the medication as prescribed.216
One factor driving this failure is the shame associated with mental
illness. The label of “dangerous,” and the shame that such a label carries,
can discourage individuals from seeking mental health treatment. People
who expressed a sense of shame about mental illness were less likely to
seek treatment, as were people who believed family members would be
ashamed of a relative diagnosed as mentally ill.217
To sum up, a narrative that individuals with mental illness are
dangerous contributes to their arrest and abuse by police, their detention
in jails and institutions, their poverty and homelessness, and underfunding
of programs to help them, and imposes such shame that individuals are
unwilling to seek treatment. Associating the mentally ill with violent acts,
as statutes barring them from possessing weapons implicitly do, hardens
this connection and thus worsens all the harms that result from the
dangerousness stigma.

212
See, e.g., NAT’L ALL. ON MENTAL ILLNESS, STATE MENTAL HEALTH CUTS: A NATIONAL
CRISIS 1 (2011) (noting that states had cut $1.6 billion in mental health spending from 2009
to 2011); Michelle R. Smith, Kennedy’s Vision for Mental Health Never Materialized, MOD.
HEALTHCARE (Oct. 20, 2013), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20131020/INFO/
310209993/kennedy-s-vision-for-mental-health-never-realized [https://perma.cc/RB2Z-2LNV]
(“[A]bout 90 percent of beds have been cut at state hospitals . . . In many cases, several
mental health experts said, that has left nowhere for the sickest people to turn . . . .”).
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CORRIGAN, supra note 211, at 53-54; see also NAT’L ALL. ON MENTAL ILLNESS, supra
note 212, at 6-8 (outlining the far-reaching implications of budget cuts, resulting in the
unavailability of crucial mental health services).
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FLAWS IN THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR MENTAL ILLNESS GUN BANS

Despite the many problems with mental illness gun bans, they remain
wildly popular, likely for two reasons. First, these bans make intuitive sense.
Society harbors a deep fear of individuals with mental illness, and no less an
authority than the Supreme Court has called these kinds of laws constitutional
restrictions on the right to bear arms.218 Second, it is one of the few areas upon
which gun safety advocates and gun rights advocates can reach agreement and
thus seems to be fertile soil for compromise.219
Both of these reasons are specious in light of the ineffectiveness of
mental illness gun bans and the great harms they cause individuals living with
mental health conditions, as outlined above. Yet other justifications for this
approach may hold some weight. From an empirical perspective, the risk of
suicide by firearm is high among individuals with mental illness and may be
a valid reason to prohibit those with mental illness from owning these
weapons.220 From a public policy perspective, opponents of eliminating these
laws could argue that removing them will have its own negative effects that
may outweigh even the harm from the dangerousness stigma.
While these arguments do give me pause, they ultimately do not outweigh
the damage wrought by these statutes, as illustrated in more detail below.
A. Guns and Suicide
The one circumstance where the evidence may support a ban on
individuals with mental illness from possessing firearms is when those
individuals are at risk of suicide. While this is rarely used as the justification
for mental illness gun bans,221 it is the justification that has the most empirical
support and the support of experts in mental illness and gun policy.222 Yet
218

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
See, e.g., Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act, S. 7026, § 10, 2016
Sen., Reg. Sess. (Fl. 2018) (including provision banning those adjudicated as “mentally
defective” or committed to a mental institution from possessing firearms); Domenico
Montanaro, Poll: Most Americans Want to See Congress Pass Gun Restrictions, NPR (Sept.
10, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/09/10/759193047/poll-most-americans-want-to-seecongress-pass-gun-restrictions [https://perma.cc/EA8B-RMX3] (describing results from a
poll that showed the highest proportion of people—eighty-nine percent—favored increasing
funding for mental health screenings and treatment as a solution to gun violence).
220
See Frederick E. Vars & Amanda Adcock Young, Do the Mentally Ill Have a Right to
Bear Arms?, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 23 (2013) (“[T]he stronger, and probably
constitutionally adequate, rationale [for gun restrictions] is suicide prevention.”).
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Id.
222
See, e.g., CONSORTIUM FOR RISK-BASED FIREARM POLICY, GUNS, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND
MENTAL ILLNESS 3 (2013) (recommending stronger state laws to prevent gun ownership
following short-term involuntary hospitalization).
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even this justification fails under scrutiny.
First, the risks. Of the 39,773 people fatally shot in 2017, nearly twothirds (23,854 people) died by suicide.223 It is, by far, the largest death toll by
guns in the United States.224
Studies have indicated that mental illness increases the danger of an
individual dying by suicide.225 As one meta-analysis noted, “[V]irtually all
mental disorders have an increased risk of suicide excepting mental
retardation and possibly dementia and agoraphobia.”226 And in psychological
autopsies of individuals who died by suicide—meaning reviews of that
person’s medical history and interviews with family and friends after their
death—ninety-one percent of those who died had a diagnosable mental
disorder, most often a mood disorder such as major depression.227
In addition, suicide attempts with a firearm tend to be vastly more
successful than attempts by other means. One study showed that 82.5% of
suicide attempts involving a gun resulted in death; the next-highest successful
means—drowning—was only successful about sixty-six percent of the
time.228 Suicide by ingesting poison or cutting oneself was successful less
than two percent of the time.229
The conclusion from these two data points seems fairly
straightforward: Individuals with mental illness have a high risk of suicide
and should be prevented from possessing firearms, which make suicide
attempts more deadly.230 But some wrinkles complicate this story.
First, most individuals with a mental illness will not die by suicide.
The lifetime risk for dying by suicide is somewhere between two and eight
percent for individuals who live with mental disorders,231 and it is nearly
223

CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, WONDER DATABASE, FIREARMS DEATHS BY
INTENT, 1999-2017 (2017), https://wonder.cdc.gov/controller/datarequest/D76;jsessionid
=806629A0D9826D46E3BDA91A8557D4F6 [https://perma.cc/T3BX-DAQ5].
224
See id. (noting that homicides, the second-highest injury intent, accounted for 14,542
firearms deaths in 2017).
225
See, e.g., E. Clare Harris & Brian Barraclough, Suicide as an Outcome for Mental
Disorders, 170 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 205, 222 (1997) (conducting a meta-analysis and
finding an increased suicide risk for most mental disorders).
226
Id.
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Jonathan Cavanagh et al., Psychological Autopsy Studies of Suicide: A Systematic Review,
33 PSYCHOL. MED. 395, 399 (2003).
228
Rebecca S. Spicer & Ted R. Miller, Suicide Acts in 8 States: Incidence and Case Fatality
Rates by Demographics and Method, 90 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1885, 1888 (2000).
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Many scholars and mental health experts agree with this conclusion. See, e.g., CONSORTIUM
FOR RISK-BASED FIREARM POLICY, supra note 222, at 3 (recommending stronger state laws to
prevent gun ownership following short-term involuntary hospitalization).
231
See Merete Nordentoft et al., Absolute Risk of Suicide After First Hospital Contact in
Mental Disorder, 68 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1058, 1061 (2011) (identifying the
absolute risk rates for suicide).
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impossible to predict who in the group labeled mentally ill will take their
own life.232 One group of researchers took a group of depressed patients
and attempted to design a model that would predict which ones would die
by suicide. Not a single prediction was correct; every person tagged as
likely to die by suicide did not do so, and the program missed every person
who did die by suicide. 233 This stunning failure led one researcher to
conclude that “suicide is difficult or impossible to predict, even among a
high-risk group of inpatients.”234
Thus, even if suicide were the justification for banning firearms
from those with mental health conditions, it would vastly overreach. Such
a restriction paints all individuals with mental illness as suicidal, when that
is not the case.
Second, suicide is often not the endpoint of a steady march through
worsening depression, as many imagine it to be. While some individuals
undergo treatment and suffer depression for many years before completing
suicide, 235 many others, up to fifty-four percent, according to a recent
study, did not have a previously known mental health issue.236 For these
individuals, suicide is spurred by despair, dark nights of the soul, or a major
negative life event—loss of wealth or status, loss of a loved one through
death or divorce, or loss of physical health.237
Retrospective studies of suicides, like the psychological autopsies
mentioned above, further the “we should have seen it coming” narrative,
which is often incorrect. Psychological autopsies of persons who died by
232
See Rise B. Goldstein et al., The Prediction of Suicide: Sensitivity, Specificity, and
Predictive Value of a Multivariate Model Applied to 1906 Patients with Affective Disorders,
48 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 418, 422 (1991) (concluding that it is unrealistic to expect
medical professionals to predict suicide based on logistic progression studies).
233
Id. at 420.
234
José Manoel Bertolote et al., Psychiatric Diagnosis and Suicide: Revisiting the Evidence,
25 CRISIS 147, 147 (2004).
235
See Nell Greenfield Boyce, CDC: U.S. Suicide Rates Have Climbed Dramatically, NPR
(June 7, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2018/06/07/617897261/cdc-u-ssuicide-rates-have-climbed-dramatically [https://perma.cc/L3C7-HKNZ] (noting that Michael
Anestis, who researches suicide, “thinks the general public commonly pictures someone who
had been getting treatment for a long period before killing themselves, like fashion designer
Kate Spade, who died this week, but that's often not the case”).
236
Id.
237
See, e.g., Maria Christina Verrochio et al., Mental Pain and Suicide: A Systematic Review
of the Literature, 7 FRONTIERS PSYCHOL., June 20, 2016, at 11 (“[T]he results indicate that
levels of mental pain are associated with an increased risk of suicide, independently from the
severity of depressive condition.”); Greenfield Boyce, supra note 235 (citing author of a
study on increased suicide rates who said that “[people with no mental health diagnosis] were
suffering from other issues, such as relationship problems, substance misuse, physical health
problems, job or financial problems, and recent crises or things that were coming up in their
lives that they were anticipating”).
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suicide rest on interviews with individuals close to the person.238 Such studies
are susceptible to hindsight biases; when looking back on a life that ended in
suicide, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that signs of depression were
apparent all along.239
By insisting upon the suicide–mental illness connection, we leave
much of the population vulnerable. Studies from non-Western countries have
shown the impact of risk factors aside from mental illness. In South Asian
countries, gender roles, cultural expectations, family conflict, and domestic
violence heightened rates of female suicide, while alcohol use, financial
issues, and interpersonal conflict are risk factors for male suicide in India.240
A focus solely on mental illness as the suicide risk leaves vulnerable many
people who cannot cope with life stressors.
Third, the stigma surrounding mental health conditions, which mental
illness gun bans help to perpetuate, could itself worsen the suicide risk.
Individuals may be less likely to seek treatment for fear of the danger label,
and lack of treatment increases suicide risk.241 Moreover, feelings of shame
have been linked to suicide, and researchers suspect that some portion of the
suicides associated with mental illness happen because the person sees herself
as “defective and humiliated.”242 Researchers have noted that suicide risk is
highest shortly after treatment begins,243 which could indicate that the shame of
a new mental illness diagnosis was a contributing cause.244 It could be that laws
238

Alison Milner et al., Suicide in the Absence of Mental Disorder? A Review of
Psychological Autopsy Studies Across Countries, 59 INT’L J. SOC. PSYCHIATRY 545, 545
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Jesse Bering, Sometimes, You Won’t Feel Better Tomorrow, SLATE (Feb. 15, 2019), https:
//slate.com/technology/2019/02/mental-illness-suicide-rational-thought-getting-help.html
[https://perma.cc/K5K5-JBEU].
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that implicitly label people as dangerous actually heighten the risk of suicide.
A mental illness gun ban is therefore a blunt instrument in suicide
prevention efforts that has deeply negative side effects, and a more
individualized approach would likely see greater success without imposing
the attendant harms. Extreme risk protection orders are one possibility. These
laws allow police to remove guns from individuals who are showing signs of
future violence against themselves or others and have shown some success in
reducing suicide rates.245 In Connecticut, for example, a judge can issue a
warrant for the seizure of a person’s guns if there is probable cause to believe
the individual poses a risk of imminent personal injury to himself or others.246
The judge considers whether the person has recently made threats; she also can
look to whether the person has brandished a firearm, used physical force against
others in the past, been involuntarily committed to a psychiatric facility, or used
illegal substances.247 One recent study of this law showed that a suicide was
prevented for every ten to eleven gun seizures that occurred.248
Another option is to allow individuals to opt in to a waiting period for
a gun purchase.249 Professor Frederick Vars has proposed allowing people to
place themselves on a “No-Guns List” that would prohibit them from
purchasing firearms, which he conceived of as a way for people to protect

perma.cc/M89J-7PG2] (“We have seen patients attempt suicide after a diagnosis of a serious
mental illness, believing their life was over anyway.”).
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& 2019 July Spec. Sess.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 7701-09 (West, Westlaw through ch.
219 of 150th Gen. Assemb. (2019-2020)); 2018 D.C. Code Ann. §§ 7-2510.01 to 7-2510.12
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through 2019 1st Reg. Sess. of the 26th Leg.); 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 67/1-80 (West,
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88 of 2019 1st Ann. Sess.); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:58-20 to -32 (West, Westlaw through
L.2019, c. 267 and J.R. No. 22); N.Y. C.P.L.R. LAW §§ 6340-47, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.45
(McKinney 2019); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 166.525-.543 ((LEXIS through 2019 Reg.
Sess.); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 4051-61 (West, Westlaw through Acts of Reg. Sess. of the
2019-2020 Vt. Gen. Assemb. (2019)); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 8-8.3-1 to 8-8.3-14 (West,
Westlaw through ch. 310 of 2019 Reg. Sess.); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.94.030,
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themselves against suicidal impulses.250 Once on the list, the individual can
only remove herself after a seven-day waiting period.251 This precommitment
against suicide both restricts access to lethal means at times of crisis and
provides individuals with a measure of control over a situation that often
feels uncontrollable.252
Proposals like these are tailored to individual situations and respond
to clear risks. They thus avoid the stigmatizing effect of a blanket ban and
would likely be a more effective means of suicide prevention.
B. Policy-Based Counterarguments
A few responses to the argument that we should eradicate gun laws
because they are both ineffective and stigmatizing: First, one might say that
the stigma against individuals with mental illness predated gun laws and
would exist even in the absence of such laws, so this change would not reap
any benefits and would come at the cost of prohibiting some number of
dangerous people from obtaining firearms. One might also argue that even if
gun laws prohibiting possession by individuals with mental illness worsen
stigma, that is still a price worth paying for fewer guns in circulation. A final
counterargument is that passage of gun safety measures is so difficult that
half-measures like a mental illness gun ban is the best we will ever do. I
address each of these counterpoints below.
1. Stigma Will Continue
While it is true that reversing course on guns would not eradicate
stigma against individuals with mental illness, it would eliminate one of the
clearest signals that society considers these people dangerous. Delinking guns
and individuals with mental illness is one of the best tools society has to
acknowledge that it was wrong in its assumption that mental illness equates
with violence.
First, while the dangerousness stigma undoubtedly existed before the
Gun Control Act and likely was a driver of the prohibitions on possession
found there, that law legitimates the stigma. Courts and academics have
recognized the power laws have in this realm.253 When stigma carries the
250

Id. at 1469.
Id.
252
Id. at 1470-71.
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See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (“[L]aws excluding samesex couples from the marriage right impose stigma and injury . . . .”); Brown v. Bd. of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483, 494 (1955) (“Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has
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legislative stamp of approval, when society’s elective bodies have said “we
deem you dangerous,” that stigma hardens into truth.
As one sociologist said in his testimony during a hearing on the
constitutionality of California’s Proposition 8, a law which had prohibited
same-sex marriage:
As we all know, the law in the state is a very important party
to creating the social environment. So clearly it’s not the only
thing that determines even experiences of prejudice and
discrimination, but it is certainly a very major player, major
factor, in creating this social environment that I described as
prejudicial or stigmatizing.254
Second, even if the repeal of a mental illness gun ban does not erase stigma
altogether, the act of removing the law could begin to drive social change. The
legislative debate surrounding repeal could force a conversation about the lack
of connection between mental illness and violence that would itself prove
illuminating for much of the public. Efforts, even unsuccessful ones, to eradicate
laws that further bias without accomplishing a societal good can alone do some
of the work of erasing stigma.255
Thus, while repeal of gun possession laws targeting individuals with mental
illness may not entirely solve the problem of stigma, it would at least remove
society’s imprimatur from the assumption that individuals with mental illness
a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction
of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the
inferiority of the negro group.” (citations omitted)); cf. IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW:
THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 78 (1996) (“Races are social products. It follows that
legal institutions and practices, as essential components of our highly legalized society, have
had a hand in the construction of race.”); Rafael Efrat, Bankruptcy Stigma: Plausible Causes
for Shifting Norms, 22 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 481, 496 (2006) (“Legislation has an
expressive function. Lawmakers regularly enact laws to express social values they attach to
certain behavior. By applying this expressive function of legislation, legislators act as norm
entrepreneurs.”); Bruce G. Link & Jo C. Phelan, Conceptualizing Stigma, 27 ANN. REV.
SOCIOLOGY 363, 378 (2001) (noting that all groups develop stereotypes of other groups, but,
for the purposes of originating stigma, “what matters is whose cognitions prevail—whose
cognitions carry sufficient clout in social, cultural, economic, and political spheres to lead to
important consequences for the group that has been labeled as different”); Susan Yeh, Laws
and Social Norms: Unintended Consequences of Obesity Laws, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 173, 176
(2013) (“Where anti-obesity dietary education laws are stricter, social stigma increases for
obese girls. On the other hand, the education penalty that obese women experience is
mitigated under anti-obesity laws.”).
254
Transcript of Proceedings at 880, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D.
Cal. 2010) (No. C 09-2292-VRW).
255
Cf. Carol Galletly et al., Criminal HIV Exposure Laws: Moving Forward, 18 AIDS
BEHAV. 1011, 1011-12 (2014) (describing government advisory groups moving from
recommending circumscribed uses of criminal law to combat HIV to opposing such
measures outright).
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pose a danger. At the same time, the debate over repeal itself, even if
unsuccessful, could change public perceptions of individuals with mental illness.
2. Guns Are Dangerous, and Fewer Guns Is a Good Thing
One might also argue that any correlation with violence—even a weak
one—is sufficient reason to prohibit possession of a dangerous item like a
gun. Moreover, preventing certain classes of people from obtaining guns
keeps the number of these dangerous items in circulation lower than it
otherwise would be.
But there are many characteristics that are correlated with violence:
some studies have indicated that having a military background or living in a
high-crime neighborhood is just as much a predictor of violence as having a
serious mental health condition. 256 Yet legislators or pundits would never
speak of banning guns from these groups, even though the benefit of fewer
guns in circulation would also be realized with those prohibitions.
Society is more comfortable with banning guns from individuals
living with mental illness because it fears them, because it sees them as
other.257 We happily infringe on the rights of this group, even though other
groups pose roughly the same small risks. Unless and until legislators are
prepared to also ban guns from other groups minimally correlated with
violence, then all a mental illness gun ban does is harden the dangerousness
stigma and worsen all the associated negative effects discussed above.
In some ways, a mental illness gun ban is more harmful than bans on
other groups would be. The number of people captured by a mental illness
gun ban is small, as serious mental illness is relatively rare in the population.
Stigma can be worse against small groups, where few people know someone
personally affected by mental illness.258 In addition, individuals living with
mental health conditions are over twice as likely to be the victims of violent
crime than other people.259 If one reason to own a gun is to be able to defend
256

See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, A STUDY OF THE PRE-ATTACK BEHAVIORS OF
ACTIVE SHOOTERS, supra note 41, at 11, 17 (noting that twenty-five percent of active
shooters had diagnosed mental illnesses, while twenty-four percent had a military
background); Steadman et al., supra note 91, at 400 (noting that both individuals who lived
in the comparison neighborhoods and individuals living with mental health conditions had
elevated rates of violence).
257
See PERLIN, supra note 32.
258
See Jennifer E. Boyd et al., The Relationship of Multiple Aspects of Stigma and Personal
Contact with Someone Hospitalized for Mental Illness, in a Nationally Representative
Sample, 45 SOC. PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHIATRIC EPIDEMIOLOGY 1063, 1067 (2010).
259
See, e.g., Virginia Aldigé Hiday et al., Criminal Victimization of Persons with Severe
Mental Illness, 50 PSYCHIATRIC SERV. 62, 66 (1999) (finding that individuals with severe
mental illness experienced violent crime at a rate two-and-a-half times higher than the
general population).
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oneself, individuals with mental health conditions likely have more of a need
for guns than others.
A better solution exists that avoids unnecessarily targeting this
marginalized group. As I illustrate in more detail below, a ban that shifts from
a focus on mental illness to one more targeted to behaviors such as past
violent acts or substance abuse260 would be more effective in capturing the
group of people who pose a risk, whether they have been diagnosed with
mental illness or not.261 And if fewer guns on the street is the goal, then such
a ban prohibits a far broader swath of people from owning a firearm.
3. This Is the Best We Can Do
This approach holds that this wholly inadequate and inapt regulation
is the best we can possibly do—a position that has neither empirical support
nor moral force. Two points in response: First, the politics of gun regulation
are in flux, and positions once thought politically untenable are being
unapologetically put forward by politicians.262 Moreover, the Supreme Court
has already blessed the concept of prohibiting dangerous people from
obtaining guns by implicitly approving prohibitions on individuals with
mental illness and felons.263 Adjustments to the law that better identify who
falls into the category of dangerous—one that tags those with violent histories
and substance abuse problems rather than those who have been confined to a
mental health facility or adjudicated incompetent—is well within the realm
of constitutional and political possibility.
Second, even if there were no prospects for better gun laws, even if this
was the best we could do, this critique ignores the harm that laws implicitly
linking mental illness and dangerous behavior are doing right now to individuals
with a mental health condition. It allows that stigma to continue for the sake of
keeping laws on the books that do little to actually stem gun violence.
Ineffective and harmful gun control laws are worse than no gun
control laws at all, both because they are causing harm without achieving
substantial benefit and because they may stymie future efforts in this arena.
The passage of mental illness gun bans—laws that reflect agreement on both
260

While substance abuse disorder is itself a type of mental illness, see DSM-5, supra note
27, this proposal would focus bans less on the status of mental illness in general and more
on a specific behavior that is highly correlated with violent acts.
261
See infra Part V.
262
See, e.g., German Lopez, How the Parkland Shooting Changed America’s Gun Debate,
VOX (Dec. 26, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/12/26/18145305/gun-control-violenceparkland-effect-2018 [https://perma.cc/HZ62-HVTQ] (discussing the increase of politicians
in 2018 elections who ran on gun control platforms).
263
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
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sides that individuals with mental illness are dangerous—likely sacrifices
legislation that would both be more effective and not exacerbate harmful
prejudices. The instinct to get some gun control, any gun control, passed does
more harm than good.264
V.

TOWARD SMARTER GUN LAWS

If lawmakers continue to focus on mental illness gun bans as a
solution to gun violence, it will not only be ineffective and stigmatizing, but
will also distract lawmakers from those risk factors that better predict
violence.
Two main categories of individuals have an elevated risk of violence:
those who have committed violence in the past and those under the influence
of alcohol or drugs.265 The best predictor of future violence is past violence,
and studies have shown, again and again, that an individual who has acted
violently in the past is more likely to do the same in the future.266 One study
of homicide arrest records in Illinois found that of individuals arrested for
murder, thirty-seven percent had a previous arrest for a violent crime.267 An
intervention that dropped the homicide risk of those with a violent arrest to
that of those without would reduce the homicide rate by 31.7%.268
Similarly, male handgun purchasers with exactly one violent
misdemeanor conviction were eight times more likely to be charged with a
later gun crime or violent crime than a person with no record.269 A handgun
purchaser with more than one previous violent conviction was ten times more
likely to be arrested for a violent crime.270
Substance abuse is also tightly linked to violent acts. As one meta264

See Marilyn Price et al., Mental Illness and the National Instant Criminal Background
Check System, in GUN VIOLENCE AND MENTAL ILLNESS 144-45 (Liza H. Gold & Robert I.
Simon eds., 2016) (“One of the most significant consequences of pursuing such policies is
that they divert attention from and support for more evidence-based legislative interventions,
while creating the mistaken perception that ‘something is being done’ to decrease the
morbidity and mortality of firearm violence.”).
265
CONSORTIUM FOR RISK-BASED FIREARM POLICY, supra note 222, at 19-20.
266
Id.
267
Philip J. Cook et al., Criminal Records of Homicide Offenders, 294 JAMA 598, 599 (2005).
268
Id. As the authors acknowledge in the study itself, using arrest metrics is a fraught calculus
because individuals may not be factually guilty of the crime for which they are arrested. But
an arrest indicates police at least had probable cause that the person committed a violent act,
which gives support to the thesis that those who have acted violently in the past have a higher
risk of doing so again in the future. Id. at 600.
269
Garen J. Wintemute et al., Subsequent Criminal Activity Among Violent Misdemeanants
Who Seek to Purchase Handguns: Risk Factors and Effectiveness of Denying Handgun
Purchase, 285 JAMA 1019, 1020 (2001).
270
Id.
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analysis stated, “the overall impression is fairly convincing, that drug abuse,
in addition to alcohol abuse, is implicated either as a cause, or as a
predisposing factor, in violent behavior.”271
Current federal gun law prohibits some of these individuals from
obtaining firearms by barring possession by felons, fugitives, persons
convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, persons subject to a
domestic violence restraining order, and unlawful users of—or those addicted
to—a controlled substance.272 Yet expanding the scope of these categories,
as a coalition of mental health and gun violence prevention experts recently
suggested, would capture a larger group of individuals with violent pasts or
who have engaged in substance abuse. This group proposed prohibiting from
firearms possession: (1) those convicted of a violent misdemeanor; (2) those
subject to a temporary domestic violence restraining order; (3) those
convicted of two or more drunk driving offenses in five years; and (4) those
convicted of two or more misdemeanor crimes involving a controlled
substance in a period of five years.273
Lawmakers could go even further and institute a licensing scheme,
like one in Massachusetts, that allows local licensing authorities to deny gun
licenses if existing factors (such as multiple domestic violence calls or
repeated episodes of public drunkenness) suggest the individual presents a
risk to public safety.274 Extreme risk protection orders, or red flag laws, could
also allow police to seize guns from individuals who committed violent
acts—such as making threats or assaulting others—or abused substances, but
who did not have an arrest or commitment record.275
When legislators hone in on mental illness as the cause of gun
violence, they miss opportunities to expand criteria focused on past violence
and substance abuse. Targeting individuals with mental illness creates the
sense that the problem is solved. The result has been proposals that tinker with
271
Alfred S. Friedman, Substance Use/Abuse as a Predictor to Illegal and Violent Behavior:
A Review of the Relevant Literature, 3 AGGRESSIVE & VIOLENT BEHAV. 339, 350 (1998).
272
18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2018).
273
CONSORTIUM FOR RISK-BASED FIREARM POLICY, supra note 222, at 3. The Consortium
also recommended maintaining and expanding firearms restrictions for those involuntarily
hospitalized as mentally ill, id., a position with which this Article disagrees.
274
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140, § 131(d) (West, Westlaw through ch. 88 of 2019 1st
Ann. Sess.). These restrictions apply to a license to carry, which allows an individual to
possess any firearm and concealed carry. If the person is applying for a firearms
identification card, which allows for possession of certain rifles or shotguns, they must still
go through the permitting process, but the licensing authority must petition a court to deny
the license. Id. §§ 129B, 129C.
275
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-38c(b) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Jan. Reg. Sess.
& 2019 July Spec. Sess.) (allowing a judge to seize a defendant’s weapons if she makes threats,
brandishes a weapon, or uses illegal substances, among other indicators of dangerousness).
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the existing system—that strengthen background checks 276 or prohibit larger
groups of individuals with mental illness from obtaining guns277—but will do
little to stop the tsunami of firearms that continues to wash over the country.278
Factors such as past violence or substance abuse issues were more
prevalent than mental health diagnoses in many recent mass shootings. Omar
Mateen, who killed forty-nine people at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, had
no mental illness history.279 He passed the background checks required for a
concealed carry permit and purchased his guns legally.280 But he had a history
of domestic violence and his wife called police in 2009 after he strangled
her. 281 Expanded prohibitions encompassing past violent acts could have
prevented his gun purchases. Jared Loughner was found incompetent to stand
trial after the Tucson shooting,282 but, prior to the shooting, had none of the
concrete indicators of mental illness required by all possession prohibition
regimes currently in force. Yet he was arrested in 2007 for drug possession283
and could have been banned from purchasing a gun under a law expanding
restrictions on drug users.
In addition to better preventing mass shootings, violent history and
substance abuse gun bans would also more effectively capture the small
subset of individuals with mental health conditions who engage in run-of-themill violence. Analysis of the MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study
data found that eighty-nine percent of former psychiatric patients who
276

See Bipartisan Background Checks Act of 2019, H.R. Res. 8, 116th Cong. (2019)
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NEW YORKER (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-wife-ofthe-pulse-night-club-shooter-goes-on-trial [https://perma.cc/Y2BP-DRXT] (describing
Mateen’s history of domestic violence but not referencing any history of mental illness); see
also Goldman et al., supra note 174 (describing Mateen’s clean record despite concerns
about his connection to a terrorist group).
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Shootings, ABC NEWS (May 25, 2011), https://abcnews.go.com/US/loughner-mentallyincompetent-stand-trial-giffords-shootings/story?id=13687399 [https://perma.cc/Q4YH-EP5V].
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See, e.g., Marc Lacey et al., Police Stopped Loughner’s Car on Day of Shooting, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 12, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/13/us/politics/13giffords.html
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and Loughner’s prior arrest); Sulzberger & Medina, supra note 77 (discussing the potential
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committed acts of gun violence had a prior arrest, twice as high as the arrest
rate of the overall sample.284 Researchers further found that the most violent
people 285 within the study group were those who were committed for
substance abuse disorders.286 Not only would expanded substance abuse and
violent history restrictions continue to ban this sub-group from purchasing
guns, but it would also prevent those with no mental health records but who
do have a high risk of future violence from obtaining guns.
Premising gun bans on substance abuse and past violent acts will
undoubtedly shift the stigma from individuals with mental illness to these
groups. Two reasons why this shift would still be preferable to the current
legal landscape: First, the links between these groups and violence have been
substantiated by multiple studies, and gun ban schemes focused on these
groups would actually help to stem American gun violence. All laws
prohibiting some kind of activity impose stigma, but the stigma is at its most
problematic when the person may not, or likely does not, possess those
characteristics being stigmatized.287 If society is to continue to insist only
dangerous people should not have guns, it will stigmatize some group of
people as “dangerous,” and our laws should at least focus on groups with the
largest risks for violent activity.288
Second, the groups of people who fall into the categories of either
those with substance abuse problems or those with a record of violence are
large and widespread, especially when compared with the small group of
individuals who have experienced serious mental illness.289 Each of us likely
knows someone with either a substance abuse problem, a history of violence,
or both, or has fallen into one of these categories at some point in our own
lives. The effects of stigma would likely not be as devastating when large
284

Steadman et al., supra note 103, at 1240.
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portions of the population either share these characteristics or have a personal
relationship with an individual within the stigmatized group. This conclusion
is supported by the studies of the impact of personal relationships with
individuals with mental illness; when a person has a friend or relative living
with a serious mental illness, she is less likely to want social distance from
individuals who have been committed to a psychiatric hospital.290
Because a substance abuse or violent history gun ban would better
capture a group that poses high risks and the injuries of the associated stigma
are less acute, these laws would have more benefits and fewer harms than the
current mental illness gun ban. 291 Such a law would therefore be more
appropriate than the status quo.
CONCLUSION
Mental illness gun bans have painted people living with mental health
conditions with a stigmatizing brush while doing little to stem the tide of gun
violence in the United States. The harm of these laws—sanctioning the
prevailing narrative that individuals with mental illness are “dangerous”—far
outweighs their supposed benefits. The dangerousness narrative has real
consequences: It makes employers less likely to hire individuals with mental
illness, landlords less likely to rent to them, and legislators less likely to
allocate money to programs to serve them. It also makes police more likely
to arrest or shoot them.
If these laws were counterbalanced by a clear benefit, if individuals
with mental illness truly were more likely to act violently and use firearms,
then their existence would be justified. But this is not the case. The links
between mental illness and violence are small and murky at best. Moreover,
the nation’s mental illness gun bans exclude many who exhibit signs of future
violence while including many who pose no risk. The only tangible
consequence of these laws is to harden the already strong stigma against
individuals with mental illness.
Mental illness gun bans should therefore be repealed. They pin the
danger label on a group that is not particularly dangerous and distract
lawmakers from real predictors of violence, such as past violent acts or
substance abuse. Discarding these laws would thus both lessen the
dangerousness stigma and its attendant harms and clear the path for gun
safety laws that would be far more successful at reducing gun violence.
290

Boyd et al., supra note 258, at 1067.
This argument raises the interesting question of when a law’s harms outweigh its benefits to
the extent that it should be repealed, which, too, is outside the scope of this Article. But any such
analysis would surely find that a law that does not accomplish its goal of stemming gun violence,
while imposing substantial stigma and attendant societal harms, is normatively undesirable.
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